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Bioterrorism Syndromic Surveillance: 
A Dual-Use Approach with Direct Application to the 
Detection of Infectious Disease Outbreaks 
 
Kristin Broome Uhde 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The threat of bioterrorism forces the public health infrastructure to focus attention on 
overall issues related to challenges posed by emerging and re-emerging infectious 
diseases. There is a crucial need to strengthen existing surveillance systems and to 
validate real-time approaches to surveillance that can provide timely alerts of epidemics 
whether they occur naturally or through a bioterrorism attack. The purpose of this study 
is to implement and evaluate a bioterrorism syndromic surveillance system called 
BioDefend™, to determine if the system could detect a potential epidemic/bioterrorism 
attack within 24-36 hours, more rapidly than it would be identified by routine health 
surveillance. This sentinel surveillance study was conducted in theme parks, theme park 
referral hospitals and clinics, and a military hospital and clinics in the Central Florida 
area. A six-month period of baseline data collection was completed at all surveillance 
sites for the purposes of serving as the comparison for the test period. The test period 
comsisted of five months and served to validate the system. The baseline was also used to 
 xiii 
identify normal illness trends and seasonality patterns so that thresholds could be 
established on which to determine significant syndromic aberrations. The web-based 
reporting system enabled near real-time data entry. The syndromic and demographic 
information then was processed in an automated analysis system to provide a mechanism 
for alerting surveillance sites when significant rises in reported syndromes and/or 
clinic/hospital daily visits exceeded the established thresholds. A pocket PC/phone 
device enabled staff to receive notification of alerts 24/7.  
The surveillance system was evaluated by comparing regional, state, and national 
surveillance data to equivalent syndromic data reported from BioDefend™. After 
comparing these data, it was determined that the BioDefend™ system detected two 
epidemics of public health importance more than one month before they were identified 
through routine regional and state, regional, and national surveillance methods. The 
specific syndromes identified earlier than the State of Florida surveillance were 
“gastroenteritis” and “influenza-like illness.” This study has examined whether or not the 
BioDefend™ surveillance system is useful in the context of the above referenced 
surveillance sites, and whether it could serve as a national model for syndromic 
surveillance.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Knowing is not enough; we must apply. Willing is not enough; we must do. 
—Goethe 
Introduction 
Our communities need valid, cost-effective, public health surveillance systems that 
will rapidly identify potential bioterrorism attacks and infectious disease epidemics. 
Implementation of surveillance systems with “dual-use” capability to detect naturally 
occurring and intentional outbreaks related to bioterrorism would be a good use of 
resources. Existing surveillance efforts would benefit from an improved rapid 
identification process required to respond promptly to bioterrorism attacks and 
epidemics.  
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention define public health surveillance as, 
“the ongoing systematic collection, analysis, and interpretation of outcome-specific data 
for use in planning, implementation, and evaluation of public health practice (thacker, 
SB).” Information gathered from surveillance systems should be used to guide public 
health action, program planning, evaluation, and policy. Analysis of surveillance data is 
based on the reasoning process of looking at individual pieces to produce an overall 
general picture of illnesses in a population (1). In addition, surveillance systems have 
helped minimize illness and death by identifying emerging and re-emerging health 
problems, identifying at-risk populations, and detecting illness trends (2). Traditional 
 15 
notifiable disease surveillance, or diagnosis-based surveillance, for infectious diseases is 
often slow and incomplete. 
During the course of a disease, there is a time lapse between the exposure and the 
expression of symptoms. Another time lag occurs between the onset of symptoms and the 
diagnosis of the illness. It is important that these time lags are reduced in bioterrorism 
and infectious disease surveillance due to the shorter incubation period and thus 
minimizing the effective treatment period, as shown in Figure 1. When comparing the 
incubation period of chronic diseases, time is more likely measured in years (1). 
Capturing biological agent exposures in near real-time or at the first point of care could 
enable the detection of potential biological exposures earlier than would be expected with 
routine health surveillance.  
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Figure 1. Disease Detection Graph  
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Routine surveillance data is normally delayed, often taking hours, days, and weeks to 
be analyzed and reported to public health officials. This time lapse in reporting is not the 
only problem with routine surveillance; additional problems can arise with respect to the 
reliability of reporting. This reporting process is not only slow, but is often overlooked by 
providers, and has been estimated that less than 20% of providers comply with reporting 
notifiable diseases (1). Routine reporting procedures are currently not timely enough for 
the early detection of bioterrorism, therefore new surveillance methods for bioterrorism 
should be developed so that illnesses can be identified in the earliest stage and reported in 
near real-time, followed by automated analysis and alerting mechanisms to public health 
officials so that appropriate interventions can be initiated. Any delays in reporting a 
bioterrorism event could allow increased transmission and exposure in the community 
and globally.  
Syndromic surveillance is not meant to replace existing notifiable disease 
surveillance, but should be used in addition, for the purposes of bioterrorism and 
infectious disease detection. Syndromic surveillance for purposes other than bioterrorism 
detection has been used for years, and simpley refers to data that is gathered before 
diagnoses are made (3). For the purposes of this study, the first signs and symptoms of 
patients visiting theme parks and military personnel and their families have been 
categorized as syndromes for the intent of assessing the frequencies of these syndromes, 
establishing thresholds for reporting an event above the norm when compared to 
historical data, and reported to health officials. 
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Over the past few years, methods for identifying the first warning signs and 
symptoms of biological exposures have led to categorizing various symptom complexes 
into syndromes. In this study, classifying illnesses into eight to twelve different syndrome 
categories was based on information gathered from similar syndromic surveillance 
studies and from the biology, clinical manifestation, and epidemiology of selected 
pathogens, as well as seasonal risks. The syndrome definitions used are consistent with 
the likely presentation of a spectrum of potential biological agents to include those with 
influenza, respiratory, skin rashes, neurological symptoms, and/or gastroenteritis illnesses 
(4).  
PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of this study was to develop, implement, and evaluate a syndromic 
surveillance system to identify bioterrorism and infectious diseases of public health 
importance in high-risk facilities, some of which are likely to serve patients before they 
visit an emergency room. Two emergency departments were also included for a more 
complete analysis of the selected theme park and military sites. Patients are likely to 
show up at emergency rooms in the late stages of disease, when treatment might be too 
late or not possible. If the first signs of illness were detected at clinics or first aid stations 
at theme parks, the person would likely present with symptoms in the earlier stages of the 
disease, when treatment might be possible, and subsequent exposures prevented. The 
locations selected as surveillance sites for this pilot study are theme parks, theme park 
referral hospital/clinics, and military hospital/clinics in the Central Florida area. 
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Facilities considered at high-risk for biological attack or other pathogens, such as the 
theme parks, are logical points for early deployment of a detection system. If a 
bioterrorism attack occurred at a theme park, persons might present with the first signs of 
an illness to the first aid stations. The first aid stations or clinics are located within the 
theme parks for easy accessibility.  
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES  
Can a syndromic surveillance system identify communicable diseases of public 
health importance before routine surveillance methods? 
Hypothesis: Improving existing surveillance methodologies by incorporating near 
real-time reporting with automated analysis and notification mechanisms would reduce 
the detection time by weeks, days, or hours. 
Is syndromic surveillance a reasonable approach for bioterrorism preparedness and 
should it be incorporated into the public health infrastructure even if the threat of 
bioterrorism disappears? 
Hypothesis: Syndromic surveillance may be useful in identifying exposures from 
biological agents and other illnesses of public health importance early enough to prevent 
subsequent disease and death, which would make it worthy of incorporating into the 
public health and medical infrastructure in certain high-risk areas.  
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STUDY JUSTIFICATION 
Bioterrorism Surveillance 
The threat of bioterrorism highlights the need to detect disease outbreaks early. 
Rapid responses to these threats would ensure the public that local, state, and federal 
health agencies are working together to serve as a safety precaution for the nation’s 
health.  
Recent findings from the National Academy of Science conducted a mimicked 
bioterrorism scenario evaluated by mathematical modeling. The results showed that a 
large-scale anthrax attack on a large U.S. city where one kilogram of anthrax spores were 
released from around 330 feet over a city of more than 10 million persons would cause 
123,400 deaths with the current levels of preparedness (5). Only by increasing our 
preparedness level will the the projected number of deaths be reduced.  
Syndromic surveillance can serve as one level of protection. Intelligence officials 
have reported the possession of weapons of mass destruction by various countries, thus 
highlighting the need for bioterrorism preparedness and the added protection of 
syndromic surveillance. Preparation for intentional outbreaks will assist in the 
preparation of naturally occurring outbreaks (6). 
Infectious Disease Surveillance 
In 2003, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention are awarding $918 million 
in bioterrorism grants (1). This time of increased attention and resources can be used to 
make lasting improvements to public health surveillance nationwide and perhaps 
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globally. The threat of emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases worldwide and the 
ability to travel globally has enabled the introduction of pathogens to countries that might 
have been previously free of them (7). 
Using Florida’s Historical Experiences 
Florida is considered a high-risk state for potential bio-threats, with the theme parks 
and Central Command. For this reason, Florida is a prime location to conduct a 
syndromic surveillance study, and could complement the state’s experience in planning 
hurricane preparedness strategies and responding to anthrax events of the recent past.  
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This study was limited to specific surveillance sites that were considered high-risk 
facilities. Results from this study might not apply to other areas in Florida or the United 
States. It was not intended that this study be representative, but to provide a service for 
high-risk facilities. The theme parks serve a unique and heterogeneous population, as 
opposed to the military facility, which serves a more homogeneous population. Having a 
more representative sample would increase the statistical power and the rapidity of 
identifying actual harmful health events. However, the purpose of this study was not to 
obtain a representative sample, but to develop, implement, and evaluate a syndromic 
surveillance system that can be used in multiple settings, especially those at high-risk of a 
bioterrorism attack (8). Syndromic data from these sources were not previously collected 
and because they are major employers in the Central Florida area, could serve as an 
indicator of the health of the community.  
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The data were also limited to healthcare providers that had a good understanding of 
the syndrome definitions. At some surveillance sites, the staff turnover rate appeared 
higher than other locations.  
The military hospital and five clinics serve only military personnel. Patients at the 
military facility included personnel traveling from other bases to be deployed, some of 
whom received pre- and post-deployment check-ups at a particular clinic.  
It was planned to compare the number of daily visits at each site with the total daily 
entry counts reported to the system. Due to the lack of obtaining reports of daily clinic 
visits from the sites, estimating compliance was not possible, and was a limitation to this 
study. In addition, the daily number of patients varied at all sites, and there was likely 
some effect of uncontrollable factors on the data, including the war and the economy. 
There was also a constant shift in staff responsibilities, especially at the military facility 
on the data, which could have affected compliance. The number of theme park visitors 
varied over time, and park directors later confirmed that seasonal fluctuations in entries at 
Park A into the system were consistent with the overall number of park visitors, which 
varied by season, weather, economy, and by the fear of war and/or bio-threats.  
RESEARCH DESIGN, STUDY POPULATION, DATA COLLECTION,  
AUTOMATED ANALYSIS AND NOTIFICATION 
This study included four theme park first aid stations/clinics, one theme park referral 
hospital emergency room, one theme park referral clinic, and five military clinics within 
the military hospital. The baseline data collection period served as the comparison for the 
test period, and to determine syndromic aberrations above the normal range and as the 
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basis of reporting alerts to the sites. Due to the lack of electronic medical records or 
patient information systems at the selected sites, a simple data collection form was used 
at each facility so that providers could classify patients according to syndrome. A data 
entry staff person entered the data into a secure website in as near real-time as possible. 
Automated analysis methods were developed and used to detect syndromic aberrations as 
a basis for notifying public health staff to enable early detection and rapid response. 
When an aberration was detected, surveillance sites were contacted and encouraged to 
use routine procedures for notifying local/state health officials based on the severity 
and/or the frequency of illnesses that exceeded the pre-established threshold.  
CONCLUSION 
If we are to prevent illnesses and death from a bioterrorism attack and/or outbreak, it 
is important to incorporate surveillance systems that can utilize primary, secondary, and 
tertiary levels of prevention, including preventing the occurrence of disease, to stop or 
slow down the disease process, and/or to reduce secondary cases of illness. Syndromic 
surveillance systems for the purposes of bioterrorism detection should also be able to 
detect outbreaks on multiple levels, such as detecting the first or earliest reports of 
illness, any rise of a particular disease, identifying an existing epidemic/outbreak, and/or 
recognizing a spatial-temporal cluster (3).  
Although current overlap exists among syndromic surveillance systems, no one 
system was identified that met all the criteria necessary for a successful and sustainable 
surveillance program, including a system that could be customized and easily integrated 
in a variety of settings. With the increased risk of bioterrorism, it is imperative that 
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surveillance systems designed for the purposes of bioterrorism identification can detect 
the initial cases of illness in a timely manner so that rapid investigation can enable public 
health action. If identified rapidly, early intervention could prevent the onset of serious 
complications among those exposed to anthrax. Figure 1 shows the small time frame of 
opportunity that is needed to treat individuals exposed to some biological agents. Early 
detection by only two days could increase the likelihood of treating those exposed before 
the treatment window expires. For this reason, a new system called BioDefend™ was 
developed, implemented, and evaluated in the selected surveillance sites in hopes that 
automated analysis could decrease the detection time of outbreaks/epidemics of public 
health importance. 
Syndromic surveillance is only one part of bioterrorism preparedness, and when 
combined with other public health disciplines, including laboratory early detection 
methodologies and training/education programs, can provide a more complete means of 
identifying and responding to bioterrorism. Systems with dual-use and near real-time 
capabilities could also be useful in identifying health effects from environmental 
contamination/exposures such as increased air or water pollution. As detection times are 
reduced, the community-based system of collecting, identifying, reporting, and increasing 
awareness could serve as a model for bioterrorism preparedness.  
We cannot directly assess the potential effectiveness of a syndromic surveillance 
system for the detection of bioterrorism, because such events are likely to be rare. 
However, these surveillance systems might be better evaluated using current emerging 
infectious diseases, such as the recent epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome 
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(SARS). With this new illness, we can see that national borders do not provide protection 
against pathogens. Margaret Hamburg, of the Institute of Medicine stated at a recent 
public briefing that, “one nation’s problem can soon become every nation’s problem,” 
and infectious diseases today are “endlessly resourceful” in adjusting to our well-
connected “global village,” (9).  
The threat of infectious diseases will not vanish, as substancial evidence shows their 
ability to resist antibiotics and mutate to remain virulent in the human population. Rapid 
mechanisms of detection are needed now and must be carefully integrated into public 
health and medical infrastructures so that they can be sustained over time. These systems 
can safeguard communities by combining state-of-the-art technology with disease 
detection strategies in order to keep up with emerging and re-emerging pathogens and 
their ability to survive circumstances (7).  
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
BACKGROUND 
In 1972 the Biological Weapons Convention assembled and 103 nations co-signed an 
agreement… “never to develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or retain 
microbial or other biological agents or toxins, whatever their origin or method of 
production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, 
protective or other peaceful purposes; and weapons, equipment or means of delivery 
designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.” 
—Alibek, BioHazard 
DETECTION OF OUTBREAKS USING DIFFERENT DISEASE SURVEILLANCE METHODOLOGIES 
Bioterrorism is “the unlawful use, or threatened use, of microorganisms or toxins 
derived from living organisms to produce death or disease in humans, animals, or plants. 
The act is intended to create fear and/or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit 
of political, religious, or ideological goals,” (10).  
Some of the reasons that terrorists might choose to use biological agents over other 
weapons of mass destruction are because these attacks are most likely invisible, and the 
perpetrator is less likely identified compared to using explosive weapons. Biological 
agents are also attractive to terrorists because they are available, easy to produce, 
infective, can be lethal, and can be stabilized as a weaponized agent. They are also 
cheaper to use compared to nuclear or conventional weapons (11). Successfully 
weaponized biological agents have been reported and terrorists may escape more easily 
after an attack due to delayed incubation periods for various pathogens.  
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It has been proposed that biological weapons have been used long before history was 
recorded. Attackers placed toxins extracted from animals and plants, including fecal 
matter on the tips of arrows to kill enemies and animals. Biological agents were also used 
by dumping dead bodies and fecal matter into water sources to contaminate the enemy’s 
water supply. Military leaders employed bioterrorism as early as the 14th century by 
catapulting smallpox and bubonic plague-infected bodies over city walls to infect 
opposing forces. Europeans used smallpox-infected blankets against the American 
Indians, and during the Revolutionary War, General George Washington mandated that 
some colonists be immunized against smallpox for the purposes of intentionally infecting 
the opposition with the virus (12).  
The increased availability of biological and chemical weapons and heightened 
expertise in weapon development technology could raise the risk of terrorist groups using 
them to launch an attack. In 1979, an incident occurred in the Soviet Union at the 
Sverdlovsk Institute of Microbiology and Virology. This institute manufactured 
biological agents for use as weapons, specifically a dry anthrax weapon for the Soviet 
arsenal. On one evening in 1979, a defective air filter in the building was removed and 
not replaced. That night, deadly anthrax spores were carried through the pipes, released 
into the evening air, and swept by the wind, infecting persons working the evening shift 
at a nearby ceramic-making plant that was located downwind from the weapons facility. 
Within a few days, many became ill, and within a week, virtually all of them died (13). 
Reports of the illness and death ranged from the sixties to the thousands, but no 
confirmed count has been made to date (14). 
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In 1995, the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo used sarin in the Tokyo subway. They 
placed sarin in soft-drink containers and lunch boxes on the floor of three different 
subway lines. Then they punched holes in the containers with umbrellas just before 
exiting the train during rush hour. Approximately 5,500 were injured during the attack. 
Not only were hospitals overflowing with patients, but 60% of victims suffered 
psychological complications, particularly post traumatic stress disorder for longer than 
six months after the attack. Some authors report that Japan had never experienced this 
form of terrorism and as a result of this attack, Japan received aid from the international 
community and has since developed its own disaster plan (15,16). The importance of this 
event showed that the healthcare system was overwhelmed with fearful persons that were 
miles away from the attack.  
The anthrax attacks that caused 22 cases of illnesses and five deaths challenged the 
U.S. public health system in the fall of 2001. Endless resources and investigations were 
implemented immediately in response to the attacks, again great fear was instilled in the 
American people by this newly introduced agent into our population (17).  
Routine infectious disease reporting and surveillance methodologies could help 
identify both types of outbreaks, those that occur naturally and those that are intentional. 
However, these methodologies can only be useful for identifying these events when 
health events are reported in near real-time (in this study, the term “near real-time” refers 
to the ability to identify illness patterns within six hours or less of a patient reporting to a 
healthcare facility with the first signs and symptoms of illnesses indicative of a biological 
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exposure). This real-time reporting capability could also be used to improve routine 
health surveillance methodologies.  
Several efforts have been made to prohibit the use of biological warfare agents, such 
as the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972. The 
latter prohibited the development, stockpiling, and retaining of any biological agents for 
any reason (18).  
Although some of these initial efforts included around 103 countries, experts 
speculate that biological weapons still exist and are ready for use. Existing published 
evidence on exact biological agents is limited, although many believe that the Soviet 
bioweapons program continued after the signing of the Biological Weapons Convention 
in 1972. A former director of the bioweapons program reported that the Soveit program 
contained over 100-plus tons of anthrax stockpiled with a production capacity of over 
1,000 tons per year, 20 tons of plague were stockpiled with a capacity to produce around 
200 tons per year, and 20 tons of smallpox were stockpiled with a production capacity of 
about 100 tons per year. Additional reports suggested that the Soviet program could 
produce more than 1,000 tons annually of the plague, tularemia, anthrax and glanders at 
various facility locations. There are an estimated 25,000 missing employees of the Soviet 
bioweapons program, and after the breakup of the Soviet Union, many have feared that 
these weapons could have fallen into the hands of our enemies. (18).  
In 1995 disclosures to United Nations Special Commission reported that Iraqi had a 
bioweapons program that produced around 19,000 liters (L) of botulinum toxin and 
weaponized 10,000L; produced 8,500L of anthrax spores with 6,500L weaponized; and 
 29 
produced 2,200L of aflatoxin and weaponized 1,580L. They also field-tested three 
different anthrax stimulants, and researched and developed camel pox, rotavirus, 
enterovirus 70, various mycotoxins and aflotoxins. United States military reports 
suggested that natural and genetically-engineered strains of bioweapon development 
continued in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. Some of these natural strains included 
Ebola, Lassa Fever, Bolivian Hemorrhagic Fever, Argentinean Hemorrhagic Fever, 
melioidosis, Japanese Encephalitis and Russian Spring-Summer Encephalitis. Suspected 
work on genetically engineered strains include antibiotic-resistant (AR) plague, AR 
anthrax, AR tularemia, AR glanders, sulfonamide-resistant glanders, smallpox with 
insertion of Venezuelan equine encephalitis genes, immune system-overcoming (IO) 
tularemia, IO anthrax, and IO plague. In the fall of 2001, media reports revealed that Iraq 
had ordered a million doses of the antidote atropine, potentially to protect their own army 
(16). Many of these biological weapons have no cure or treatment, thus making them 
prime agents for terrorists. It has also been reported that the use of bioweapons can cause 
chronic health problems, including mutagenesis, carcinogenesis from viral infections, 
teratogenesis, and the creation of new diseases (19). Other federal reports stated that 
several other countries have “probable” biological weapons programs, including China, 
Iran, North Korea, Libya, Syria, Taiwan, Cuba, Israel, and Egypt (18).  
The World Health Organization noted the threat of biological weapons decades ago 
and stated that bioweapons were strategic, population-destroying devices (20). Today, we 
know that the technology used to build and disperse these weapons has advanced. Our 
capabilities to detect and respond to them should likewise advance. A recent study on 
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past and present weapons programs revealed about 30 countries that potentially 
possessed biological and chemical weapons. Table 1 shows the status of various 
weapon’s programs by country as reported by the Monterey Institute of International 
Studies (21).  
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Country Biological Program Status Chemical Program Status 
Algeria Research, but no evidence of production Possible 
Canada Former Former 
China Likely maintains offensive program Probable 
Cuba - Possible 
Egypt Likely maintains offensive program Probable 
Ethiopia - Probable 
France Former Former 
Germany Former Former 
India Research, but no evidence of production Former 
Iran Likely maintains offensive program Known 
Iraq Previously active research & production; potential 
reconstruction of programs 
Known; Potential reconstruction 
program 
Israel Research, possible production Probable 
Italy -  Former 
Japan Former Former 
Libya Research, possible production Known 
Myanmar -  Probable 
North Korea Research, possible production Probable 
Pakistan Possible Probable 
Russia Research, some work beyond legitimate defense activity 
may continue 
Probable 
Soviet Union Former Former 
South Africa Former Former 
South Korea -  Former 
Sudan Possible research program Possible 
Syria Research, possible production Probable 
Taiwan Possible research program Probable 
U.K.  Former Former 
U.S.A. Former Former 
Viet Nam -  Possible 
Yugoslavia, Federal Republic 
of (FRY) 
None/Unknown Former 
Table 1. Reported Biological and Chemical Weapons Programs by Country from 
Monterey Institute of International Studies 
The potential economic impact of a bioterrorism attack would be devastating. It 
would drain a vast majority of community, state, and federal resources, both human and 
financial, as seen by a model that addresses three agents, including Bacillus anthracis, 
Brucella melitensis, and Francisella tularensis. If 100,000 people were exposed to 
Brucella melitensis, the estimated cost burden is approximately $478 million. If the agent 
was Bacillus anthracis, the cost burden increases to $26 billion (22).  
Based on these costs, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention researchers 
recommended a rapid implementation of a post-attack prophylaxis program as the most 
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important means to reduce human losses (22). Reducing exposures and transmission by 
way of early detection would more effectively minimize human and financial loss by 
preventing exposure rather than relying on after-attack treatments. Perhaps a combination 
of effective prevention and treatment is superior to either strategy alone.  
From the first Gulf War to the current situation of U.S. military involvement in Iraq, 
some have expressed that the potential threat of biological weapons being used against 
military forces and civilian populations would increase, and could likely be part of the 
Iraqi response to U.S. forces (23). However, no weapons were used or found to date.  
In response to events of September 11, 2001, the President signed an Executive 
Order Number 13228 instructing Americans to, “…coordinate development of 
monitoring protocols and equipment for use in detecting the release of biological, 
chemical, and radiological hazards,” as reported in Section 3D (24). More recently, the 
Homeland Security Act approved by Congress and signed by the President on November 
25, 2002, involved over 30 federal agencies to establish the Department of Homeland 
Security to prevent terrorism aimed at the United States (25).  
Findings reported in The Lancet suggested that the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Response Act is the pulse of the U.S. response to bioterrorism. This act was 
implemented to create a unified national approach to identify the goals needed to respond 
to existing bio-threats, and are listed as such: tracking biological agents on U.S. soil; 
increasing existing knowledge about infectious disease surveillance; and improving the 
timeliness of reporting disease trends (26).  
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This is a critical time in our nation’s history as many public health disciplines have 
joined together to plan and respond to existing bio-threats through the use of various 
surveillance methodologies. The use of public health surveillance is needed for an 
effective response (27).  
Surveillance for biological warfare agents is difficult due to their variable incubation 
periods and the nonspecific nature of the symptoms (28). Based on the nature and 
severity of the symptoms, the victim may delay seeking medical care from a primary 
health care provider. In a report from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
regarding the anthrax attacks, six of seven cases described presented to clinics instead of 
an emergency department (4). It is likely that by the time patients present to an 
emergency department, it may be too late in the course of the disease to provide effective 
treatment. The growing threat of bioterrorism forces the public health infrastructure to 
focus attention on these challenges posed by bio-threats, as well as emerging and re-
emerging infectious diseases.  
With the current war on terrorism, public health officials should also consider the 
historical effect of war on the spread of infectious diseases. Results of the first Gulf War, 
led to the breakdown of water and sanitation, which was responsible for outbreaks of 
gastroenteritis, malaria, meningitis, brucellosis, measles, polio, hepatitis, typhoid, and 
other diseases (19).  
We critically need to strengthen existing surveillance systems and to enhance 
innovative real-time approaches to surveillance that can provide timely alerts of 
epidemics whether they occur naturally or through an intentional attack (29). By 
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monitoring the earliest warning signs and symptoms of an outbreak or bioterrorism 
attack, surveillance systems like the one used in this study, could reduce the time it takes 
to identify a series of adverse health events when compared to the routine surveillance 
methods. This reduction in time to detection could significantly decrease morbidity and 
mortality in the event of a bioterrorism attack/epidemic (4). 
BIOTERRORISM SYNDROMIC SURVEILLANCE 
Bioterrorism syndromic surveillance is a type of surveillance used to track specific 
syndromes before a diagnosis is made that can serve as indicators of many infectious 
diseases and bioterrorism agent exposure in a specified population. Each syndrome is 
made up of a group of the first symptoms experienced when a person has been exposed to 
a bioterrorism agents and/or infectious disease. The case definitions used for many 
syndromic surveillance studies originated from the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention and the Department of Defense (4, 56).  
The earliest symptoms of bioterrorism agent exposure will present as non-specific 
illnesses, such as respiratory tract infection with fever, influenza-like illness, 
gastroenteritis, and/or febrile illness. Several versions of syndrome listings are currently 
being used, and many are customized based on the needs of the population being surved. 
Currently, there is no standard system or method that has been recommended for 
bioterrorism syndromic surveillance (1). Most syndromic surveillance projects have not 
been evaluated or published in peer-reviewed literature. Published peer-reviewed 
literature about bioterrorism syndromic surveillance is scarce, but based on discussions 
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with state and federal health professionals, routine bioterrorism syndromic surveillance in 
every hospital and clinic across the nation may not be appropriate or cost effective.  
This type of active surveillance is not meant to replace existing methods of reporting 
notifiable disease, but to enhance or supplement diagnosis-based surveillance so that 
early detection can lead to earlier response. The importance of the dual-use nature of 
these systems can be seen with influenza surveillance in which the system does not 
identify a specific illness but identifies surges in influenza-like illnesses to use as a 
predictive means for determining influenza seasonal patterns, or as indicators of other 
diseases. 
There are currently many discussions regarding the appropriate setting for 
surveillance, whether it is in an emergency room, clinic, or among special populations, 
such as the military and theme parks. Some believe that emergency rooms are the best 
places to launch surveillance, however, others argue that emergency rooms are too late to 
detect the first signs and symptoms. Often when people begin to experience flu-like 
symptoms are more likely to visit a clinic as opposed to the emergency department, 
where more severe patient tend to visit (30). This was seen during the anthrax cases in 
2001, where six of the seven cases presented to clinics (4). Some believe that syndromic 
surveillance should be deployed only among special or high-risk populations, or other 
facilities at risk for a bioterrorist attack, such as military hospitals, VA hospitals, 
government facilities, and theme parks (8). Other discussions involve implementing 
surveillance among facilities that serve children and/or the elderly because these 
population can be more susceptible to illnesses and might be locations in which an event 
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would be detected early. Recent discussions and syndromic surveillance efforts are 
evolving that test whether or not multiple data sources of syndromic data can increase the 
likelihood of capturing true epidemics (30). Most agree that bioterrorism syndromic 
surveillance systems should be manned and housed by local and state health departments, 
and will be able to link to federal surveillance systems (31).  
An effective response to an attack/epidemic requires and depends on rapid reporting 
and communications among public health agencies. Epidemiological principals are 
necessary components of syndromic surveillance systems, providing for interpretation of 
the data, meaningful feedback to the participating institutions, and to local, state, and 
federal public health agencies responsible for investigating epidemics/attacks. The 
current bioterrorism threat and its potential effect(s) on the population and the healthcare 
system are reason enough to aim to have syndromic surveillance data automatically 
analyzed and alerting capability around the clock (32).  
Waiting until an emergency situation occurs is not the best time to implement 
methods of detection (32). A more logical and cost-effective method of responding to a 
bioterrorism threat is before an attack occurs. It is critical that public health officials have 
clear goals in which to plan, implement, and evaluate surveillance methodologies before 
an event occurs. If data from any surveillance program is incomplete and the system has 
been implemented and systems are only used during emergency situation, decision-
making will likely be hasty, and lead to vast resources allocated to response rather than to 
prevent an event (27).  
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Implementing well-developed rapid surveillance mechanisms before an attack could 
be useful in establishing baseline illnesses and health risks patterns in a population so 
that thresholds can be established and serve as a comparison during an epidemic or 
bioterrorism attack. These early detection systems could serve as the foundation from 
which to identify, evaluate, and respond to bioterrorism and infectious disease events of 
public health importance.  
Medical professionals have discussed other methods of bioterrorism syndromic 
surveillance, and some believe that only an astute physician will identify and report 
unusual illnesses to appropriate authorities. This may not be the case, especially as most 
U.S. physicians have not seen patients infected with many bioterrorism agents of 
concern. Furthermore, physicians do not have the means to identify illness patterns 
exposures that could be seen when syndromic data are aggregated, nor would they be 
able to identify  
illness clustering as can be automatically mapped in syndromic surveillance. 
The results of a study published in the American Journal of Public Health showed 
that healthcare providers in emergency rooms reported that they did not feel prepared in 
the event of a biological and/or chemical attack (33). Bioterrorism syndromic 
surveillance, in combination with provider awareness, could reduce the time it takes to 
identify biothreats that otherwise might not be identified for hours, days, and perhaps 
weeks (7).  
Training and education of healthcare providers should be an important component of 
any surveillance program. This type of training should incorporate methods for 
 38 
recognizing the clinical presentation of bioterrorism agents through syndrome definitions, 
maintaining a high level of suspicion, recognizing unusual epidemiological trends, 
prevention and treatment of bioterrorism agents, and knowing how and where to report 
potential bioterrorism cases (11). 
There have been numerous bioterrorism syndromic surveillance systems developed 
since September 11, 2001, but few have been published in peer-reviewed literature, or 
been formally evaluated. Syndromic surveillance has been implemented in emergency 
rooms, during special events, and among special populations. Data collection methods 
range from telephone and facsimile data transmission to web-based reporting systems. 
Some systems also claim to be bioterrorism syndromic surveillance systems and are 
based soley on diagnosis-related coding, which is by definition, not syndromic 
surveillance.Very few of these systems have real-time reporting capabilities and 
automated analysis. It is important to note that mere data collection is not surveillance, 
and systems that require staff to run statistical processes on data are not “real-time” and 
are not optimal for the purposes of rapidly detecting bioterrorism agent exposures (34). 
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 System 
Brief Description 
Criteria Importance of 
Criteria 
RSVP- 
Relies on provider data 
entry of 6 syndromes 
and immediately sends 
alerts to the Dept. of 
Health Epidemiologist. 
STARS- A web-
based system that 
collects syndromic 
and demographic 
data and requires 
manual data analysis. 
LEADERS-. 
Web-based 
system used in 
special events.  
ESSENCE- Developed 
for the military. Data 
extracted from diagnosis 
related codes and 
analysis conducted 
manually every 8 hours. 
Adjustable 
thresholds that 
are used to define 
syndromic 
aberrations 
 Unknown No No Unknown 
Reasonable cost This is needed for sustainability  Yes Yes No Unknown 
Outcome 
evaluation 
Results should be 
published and the 
system evaluated 
No None Yes (4) Limited 
Setting of system Setting appropriate for system? Hospitals and clinics 
Emergency 
departments 
Clinics and 
emergency dpts  
Clinics and emergency 
departments 
Technologically 
advanced system 
and capabilities 
 Unknown No No Unknown 
Compatibility 
with state and 
federal 
surveillance 
systems 
It is important that 
systems can be fed 
into National 
surveillance 
programs 
Unknown No Unknown Unknown 
Spatial data 
distribution 
Useful for 
mapping 
syndromic clusters 
Yes No Limited No 
Adjustable 
thresholds 
(sensitivity and 
PVP) 
This is important 
during flu season Unknown No No Unknown 
Automated 
analysis 
This is necessary 
for near real-time 
BT detection.  
No No No No 
Automated alerts 
Required for near 
real-time reporting 
of potential events. 
Yes No No No 
Timeliness of 
outbreak 
detection 
Shown through 
evaluating 
surveillance 
experiences. 
Unknown No No No 
Baseline data 
collected 
This is Important 
for establishing 
thresholds for 
reporting events. 
Yes Limited Limited Yes 
User Friendly Necessary for sustainability. Yes Somewhat Somewhat Unknown 
System 
Customizability 
Necessary for 
sustainability. Yes None None None 
System Security 
Data needs 
secured from 
hackers 
Yes Unknown Unknown Unknown 
Table 2. Bioterrorism Syndromic Surveillance System Comparison 
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 System 
Brief Description 
Criteria Importance Of 
Criteria 
RedBat-  
Scans symptoms from 
hospital databases and 
automatically calculates 
a score for each 
symptom to be 
categorized into one of 
ten syndromes. 
RODS- 
Automatically 
collects and stores 
de-identified regional 
ER data. Analyzes, 
displays results. 
EARS- Collects 
911 calls, schools, 
ER, & clinic data. 
Compares data to 
7-day mean. 
Manual analysis.  
 
SURVEIL-  
Symptom data is 
collected and auto 
converted to ICD-9 
codes. Manual 
analysis 
Adjustable 
thresholds used 
to define 
syndromic 
aberrations 
 Yes Unknown Unknown Yes 
Reasonable cost This is needed for sustainability  Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown 
Outcome 
evaluation 
Results should be 
published and the 
system evaluated 
No No No Limited 
Setting of system Is the design appropriate? Emergency department 
 E.R. department, lab 
reports, and clinics 911 calls 
E.R., clinics, and 
nurse call centers 
Technologically 
advanced system   Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown 
Compatibility 
with state and 
federal systems. 
It is important that 
systems can be fed 
to national & state 
programs 
Unknown Yes Yes Unknown 
Spatial data 
distribution 
Useful for 
mapping 
syndromic clusters 
Yes Yes Yes No 
Adjustable 
thresholds 
(sensitivity and 
PVP) 
This is important 
during flu season Yes Unknown Unknown Unknown 
Automated 
analysis 
This is necessary 
for near real-time 
BT detection.  
Yes No No No 
Automated alerts 
Required for near 
real-time reporting 
of potential events. 
Unknown Yes No Unknown 
Timeliness of 
outbreak 
detection 
Shown through 
evaluating 
surveillance 
experiences. 
Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown 
Baseline data 
collection 
Important for 
thresholds for 
events. 
Unknown Unknown Yes Unknown 
User friendly Necessary for sustainability. Unknown Minimal Minimal Unknown 
System 
Customizability  
Necessary for 
sustainability. Unknown Unknown Unknown Yes 
System security 
Syndromic and 
demographic data 
needs to be 
secured from 
hackers. 
Unknown Unknown Unknown Unknown 
Table 2. Bioterrorism Syndromic Surveillance System Comparison (Continued) 
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This is a comparative summary of several syndromic surveillance systems, some of 
which are commercial. This review of existing systems was conducted for the purpose of 
selecting the appropriate system for this study. There have been numerous systems 
developed since the September 2001 terrorist attacks. This review is not comprehensive, 
but is a good representation of systems available. The criteria for comparing the systems 
was selected and based on two papers published by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, and titled: Updated Guidelines for Evaluating Public Health Surveillance 
Systems; and the Draft Framework for Evaluating Syndromic Surveillance Systems. This 
comparison summary was written for the purposes of facilitating the comparison of 
different studies and systems to help public health agencies determine the best 
mechanisms of selecting appropriate surveillance systems (2, 3). Table 2 shows several 
systems compared using criteria defined in the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention publications.  
Surveillance data are usually gathered one of two ways: 1) by collecting new data; 
and/or 2) by collecting existing data from electronic medical records or patient 
information systems (35). Determining the appropriate data collection method depends 
on the data that are available. The optimal means of data collection is to use a system that 
automatically abstracts and submits syndromic information from existing electronic 
medical records to a database (30). A common problem is that not all healthcare facilities 
have electronic information systems, therefore many surveillance efforts have focused on 
collecting new data by using paper forms completed by healthcare staff (30). This 
requires the provider to complete the syndromic and demographic information and a data 
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entry staff person to submit the forms into the database. Some systems automatically 
abstract data from diagnosis-related databases (36-38). This is not syndromic surveillance 
because syndromic surveillance by definition is data collected before a diagnosis is made, 
before data is coded (30). The coding of patient illnesses into diagnosis-related codes can 
take several days to several weeks, and is much too late for early identification of a 
bioterrorism attack (3, 30). The limitations of ICD-9 codes are that they were originally 
designed for billing purposes, and sometimes take a few days to a few weeks to be coded. 
Coding systems, such as the ICD-9 system uses specific diagnoses and they are not well-
matched to the syndromes currently used in many bioterrorism surveillance efforts. The 
data should be available immediately or at best, in less than six hours, anything more 
than 12-24 hours is not timely enough to be useful for infectious disease outbreaks or a 
bioterrorism event. 
A few syndromic surveillance systems described were viewed or used through 
interactive demonstrations; other system information was gathered from publicly 
available marketing systems documentation. There were many systems reviewed, but not 
all included in the comparison. The sample in Table 2 was chosen to show the variety in 
methods, data sources, and settings used for surveillance. Demonstrations were 
conducted on the following systems: the Lightweight Epidemiological Advanced 
Detection and Emergency Response System (LEADERS); the Electronic Surveillance 
System for the Early Notification of Community-Based Epidemics (ESSENCE); the 
Rapid Syndrome Validation Project (RSVP); Real-time Outbreak and Disease 
Surveillance (RODS); and the Syndromic Tracking and Reporting System (STARS) (36-
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43). There were three other systems described in Table 3, but due to the lack of complete 
information about the systems, they will not be discussed in the text. 
LEADERS was the syndromic surveillance system used during the September 11 
attacks in New York City, the World Trade Organization Seattle Ministerial Conference, 
and during the Superbowl in 2001. This system is a commercial web-based system that 
provides medical surveillance and other emergency department software. This system 
was one of the first syndromic surveillance systems developed and deployed, and has 
been used in emergency departments. The system requires that medical personnel collect 
syndromes and demographic data for entry into a database. The system lacks flexibility, 
for example, data forms cannot be customized for individual sites. The reporting tool is 
standard, and can not be updated or improved. The system also lacks an automated 
analysis and alerting component, thus missing the real-time capability critical for the 
early detection of bioterrorism. This system does not use sufficient baseline data needed 
for determining accurate thresholds for reporting alerts. Without enough baseline data, 
too many false alarms, as was the case during the September 2001 deployment in New 
York City. These false alarms and resulting investigations have been associated with 
large costs, and overburdening public health officials (4). Essentially, this system is a 
database that requires staff to download the data and import it into a statistical software 
package for analysis to identify any aberrations in the data. The system is also costly, and 
too high to be sustained by local health department. These costs do not include staff 
required to analyze and interpret data, which has been reported that analyses are 
completed twice daily (43).  
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R.S.V.P. was developed by Sandia National Laboratory, and funded by the U.S. 
Department of Energy’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Non-Proliferation program. 
This system is used in emergency departments and clinics, and utilizes six syndromes 
that are assessed in the clinical setting. The primary purpose of this system is to aid the 
communications between public health officials and health care providers for the 
purposes of facilitating healthcare providers in the reporting of suspicious or unusual 
symptoms. Once syndromes are entered into the system, information about recent disease 
outbreaks is provided to healthcare providers (41, 44).  
ESSENCE was developed by Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory 
and sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. It began as a 
surveillance system to detect a bioterrorism attack within the military population, but has 
expanded to include some civilian organizations. This system is not based on syndromes, 
but ICD-9 codes, and is therefore not considered to have the real-time capability required 
for bioterrorism early detection. Recent reports indicate that ESSENCE has been 
implemented in several countries outside the U.S. Additional non-traditional data sources 
have been added to the surveillance program. Increasing the types of surveillance data 
used to identify events should reduce the number of false positives. This system does not 
have automated data analysis, but reports indicate that data are analyzed every eight 
hours. By not having the analysis and alerting automated, it is not possible to detect 
events in near real-time. Baseline data are collected from historical data to serve as a 
comparison. The major limitations with this system are timeliness and quality of data (36, 
37, 38). 
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The RODS system is a major statewide effort, involving health departments, medical 
centers, hospitals, and foundations in Pennsylvania. The system has automated analysis 
and alerting capability, but appears to be based on chief complaints and ICD-9 coding 
using medical information systems. An advantage of this system is that it also uses 
multiple data sources, has a spatial analysis component, and is compatible with the 
National Enhanced Disease Surveillance System and Health Level 7 (HL-7) messaging, 
thus making it possible for data to be fed into the federal surveillance system (39, 40).  
STARS is a syndromic system modeled after LEADERS and developed by the 
Hillsborough County Health Department in Tampa, Florida for use in emergency 
departments. The system is very similar to LEADERS, in that it is basically a database 
for storing syndromic reports. STARS does not contain automated reporting, analysis, or 
alerting capabilities. As with LEADERS, STARS continues to place a high burden on the 
providers, for example, for every person that visits the emergency department, syndromic 
and devographic information must be completed by the provider. This burden of 
completing forms on all patients regardless of whether or not they have a syndrome is not 
practical (42).  
The various bioterrorism syndromic surveillance systems currently being used 
incorporate a variety of data sources, both traditional and non-traditional. Table 3 is a list 
of several data sources that are currently being used (30, 44). 
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• Chief complaints 
• Diagnosis-related codes 
• 911 calls/ambulance run sheets 
• Hospital admissions 
• Laboratory tests 
• Prescription drug use 
• Over-the-counter drug sales 
• School/work absenteeism 
• Death certificates  
• Poison control centers 
• Animal illness surveillance 
Table 3. Data Sources 
Formal evaluation of many of the syndromic surveillance systems and the use of data 
sources have not yet been published, Surveillance of multiple data sources will increase 
the likelihood of not only detecting, but confirming an event. For example, if an increase 
in gastroenteritis was seen at local clinics and the emergency department, it might be 
confirmed with a laboratory data. By integrating more than one data source, the accuracy 
of reporting events should increase, thus reducing the human and financial resources 
spent on investigation and response (30). 
Many of the systems use similar syndrome definitions, most of which were defined 
by federal agencies. A few surveillance system studies reported being compliant with 
federal surveillance systems, such as National Electronic Disease Surveillance System 
(50). There appeared to be a lack of the use of baseline data in surveillance efforts. 
Baseline data is important to establish thresholds for reporting alerts to public health 
officials. These thresholds need to be as accurate as possible so that the public health 
departments will not be overburdened with responding to false alarms. 
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We cannot wait for another bioterrorism attack to occur before we react. Taking the 
time now to plan, implement, and evaluate an effective response is crucial. The 
experience of deploying a surveillance system in the midst of a terrorist attack highlights 
many of the issues that could be resolved with advanced planning. Government officials 
should be commended for attempting this task during an emergency setting; however, the 
outcomes from the system deployed during the September 11, 2001 attacks may not be 
applicable in different settings, nor in situations that established surveillance programs 
with sufficient time for planning (4).  
NEW YORK CITY SYNDROMIC SURVEILLANCE EFFORT 
During the evening of September 11, 2001, after the terrorist attacks on the World 
Trade Center Towers, New York health officials, with the help of the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention health officials, decided to quickly implement a drop-in 
bioterrorism syndromic surveillance system for 30 days in order to help identify a 
potential secondary biological attack. The system was implemented in 15 hospital 
emergency departments, and to identify other health-related issues from the terrorist 
attacks on the towers. A data collection form was used to classify all patients into one of 
12 syndromes. Seven, of which were indicative of bioterrorism agent exposure, four were 
syndromes associated with illnesses related to the attacks. A few days after implementing 
the system, training and orientation meetings were held for hospital staff, and up to three 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Epidemic Intelligence Service Officers were 
placed in each hospital. Data entry was conducted on-site, and follow-up investigations 
were conducted in response to alarms (4). 
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A low compliance of form completion was reported before the Epidemic Intelligence 
Service Officers were deployed. The system appeared to be overly sensitive, most likely 
due to the lack of baseline data. A total of 91 alerts were generated during the 30-day 
period. All of the alerts were from one of the following syndromes: gastrointestinal; 
respiratory; rash; neurological; and sepsis. There were 26 gastrointestinal-related alarms, 
and 25 respiratory-related alarms. These alarms were investigated, but none were 
suggestive of a bioterrorism attack or outbreak (4). 
The results were one of the first documented uses of syndromic surveillance for the 
purpose of bioterrorism detection, and contributed in part to the improvement of systems 
currently in use. Due to the urgency of implementation, there was not a period of baseline 
data collection. The overly sensitivity of these results regarding the high frequency of 
false alarms showed the need for using baseline data to help minimize false alarms by 
establishing normal thresholds and identifying syndromic aberrations. The burden on 
providers, Epidemic Intelligence Service Officers, and technical staff was high, and the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention authors reported that the study probably 
would have not been possible without the addition of the Epidemic Intelligence Service 
Officers. This study probably would not be sustainable for these reasons. In addition, a 
completed data collection form was required for each patient in all 15 hospitals every 
day. Only 6.4% of the total reports were reported as syndromes, leaving about 94% of all 
data collection on patients with no syndrome. This is a tremendous burden when each 
form requires patient demographic information to be completed even when the patient 
did not have a reported syndrome. Manual data entry resulted in coding errors and helped 
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contribute, along with the lack of baseline data, to false alarms. It was also assumed that 
patients would present to emergency departments. Emergency rooms may not be the 
appropriate place for syndromic surveillance because the patients are likely to present in 
the latter stages of a disease, and may be too late for the system to serve as an early 
warning device. Clinics might be location where patients present during the beginning 
states of a disease. Of the seven patients diagnosed with anthrax during the October 2001 
attack, six of them did not present to the emergency departments, but to clinics. Finally, 
authors reported that it was unknown whether this type of drop-in system could detect a 
biological attack faster than individual physician reports (4). Implementation the system 
was justified, given the perceived risk of terrorist attacks. Since this event, a new and 
improved automated system replaced the system used during the attacks. Continued 
research on bioterrorism syndromic surveillance, and the need to remove the personnel 
burden, to refine detection methods, and to ensure systems are designed that are flexible 
enough to be integrated into various settings (4). 
An example of a more favorable scenario includes one in which the system was 
given a chance to be seeded into routine healthcare practices. The major limitations 
encountered in several surveillance systems are high cost, excessive labor, occurrence of 
false alarms, and the lack of baseline data, all of which likely contributed to the excessive 
amount of time and money needed to respond to false alarms (4).  
The most effective strategy for staging an early detection system would be one that is 
tested and improved upon in multiple “every day” settings. Identification of the best 
methods and practices for the integration of a surveillance program into the existing 
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workflow of target healthcare settings is equally important to achieve lasting programs 
that are acceptable to the health care providers implementing them. Only after careful 
evaluation in both settings and under non-emergency scenarios will it be possible to 
determine where and how such surveillance systems may be best deployed.  
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention currently has a draft framework on 
how to evaluate bioterrorism syndromic surveillance systems, which is useful for 
evaluating syndromic surveillance systems (3). If syndromic surveillance systems are to 
continue improving, documenting early successes and evaluation is important. The 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention article recommends that evaluation of 
systems should include the purpose, a description of the system, the target population, the 
goals, and how it works. The experiences of planning and implementing the system 
should also be described and a determination made regarding whether or not the system 
was useful, acceptable to the staff implementing it, generalizable for use in various 
settings, sufficiently stable enough to achieve consistent results, and whether it is cost 
effective. The detection of outbreaks should be described and based on the flexibility of 
the system to respond to changing risks, sensitivity of the system to capture true cases of 
illness, and the timeliness of reporting, analysis, alerting, and detection. The quality of 
the data should be assessed for representativeness, completeness, reliability, and 
consistency. Publications should include recommendations and conclusions based on 
their experiences in furthering and improving syndromic surveillance (3). To conclude, it 
is important for public health officials to recognize that mere data collection is not 
surveillance (51).  
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The first Gulf War experience emphasized the importance of health during military 
deployment. Recent research shows that health surveillance can be useful in the military 
to help identify health risks by using a baseline of health status before, during, and after 
deployment (52). Bioterrorism syndromic surveillance and military surveillance could be 
used together to enhance and facilitate the identification of health risks.  
This type of surveillance have been predicted to be useful in detecting newly 
emerging diseases, such as the presence of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome. 
Additional uses include detecting seasonal variations, geographical clustering, and 
increases in hospital admissions/clinic visits, animal illnesses, and epidemiological links 
to a particular event (53).  
Incorporating syndromic surveillance could strengthen the overall public health 
infrastructure and be an efficient and effective use of resources through early detection 
and a means to provide some level of protection against the consequences of an attack 
(53). Some useful epidemiological observations that can be used to help interpret and 
identify an attack using syndromic surveillance data include surges of patients to 
healthcare facilities, large numbers of illnesses in persons that attended a similar event, 
animal deaths, large numbers of illness or deaths among the old and the young, recent 
terrorist threats, illnesses normally treatable that are unresponsive to routine treatment, 
surges in illnesses with high morbidity and mortality, and/or unusual illnesses for a 
particular season or location (28). 
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Surveillance for Emerging Infectious Diseases 
Surveillance of bioterrorism and infectious diseases overlaps in that their clinical 
presentation and routes of transmission are similar. Infectious diseases continue to be the 
leading cause of morbidity and mortality worldwide. Reports from the Institute of 
Medicine indicate that improvements to the public health infrastructure are needed 
globally in order to address the threat of infectious diseases. Illnesses such as HIV, multi-
drug resistant tuberculosis, and viral hemorrhagic fevers serve as reminders that 
infectious diseases deserve continuous concern and care (54).  
Due to the nature and overlap of bioterrorism agents and infectious diseases, a 
unified approach to dual-use surveillance methodologies should be addressed. Existing 
federal support for bioterrorism could also incorporate infectious disease surveillance and 
use funds as a means to improve upon existing successes and methods of surveillance 
that can be used for both purposes (7).  
One of the main concerns in regard to infectious disease surveillance is that the 
reporting has not been as rapid as necessary for bioterrorism detection. If existing 
infectious disease surveillance and reporting practices are improved upon by eliminating 
the delay in reporting, reduction of the potential disease and death burden associated with 
a bioterrorism attack and/or outbreak of an infectious disease could be a result. The threat 
of a bioterrorism attack and/or infectious disease outbreaks extend beyond U.S. borders, 
and is now a worldwide problem.  
A global response to terrorism would be optimal, and many countries including 
members of the European Union are planning response strategies. Many of these 
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countries are looking to the U.S. for best methods and practices for an effective response. 
Recent gaps in the European Union’s response to global threats have been identified as 
the need for, anticipation, support, and coordination of bioterrorism preparedness and 
communicable disease control programs (26).  
In the age of working globally to advance the early detection of disease outbreaks, 
new methods of integrating technologies to allow for “real-time” surveillance is 
imperative. Research suggests the need to increase the role of computer networking in 
investigating unusual disease outbreaks and bioterrorism attacks worldwide. With the 
worldwide threat of infectious diseases and increased international travel, new 
opportunities to communicate globally could decrease the detection time of a 
bioterrorism attack (55). 
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODS 
The reason for collecting, analyzing and disseminating information on a disease is to 
control that disease. Collection and analysis should not be allowed to consume resources 
if action does not follow. 
—Foege W.H., Journal of Epidemiology 
 
ORIGINS OF THE STUDY 
In 2000, the University of South Florida, College of Public Health received a 
contract from the Department of Defense, U.S. Army Soldiers Biological and Chemical 
Command for research against biological threats. One sub-task of this contract was a 
research project on surveillance for bioterrorism. Two approaches were defined to 
include theme parks and schools. This paper summarizes the theme park syndromic 
surveillance research project. Over time, the study intended for the theme parks evolved 
to include other special populations that were considered high risk for potential 
biological threats (8). Theme parks, theme park referral hospitals and clinics, and a 
military hospital and clinics in the Central Florida area were invited to participate in this 
study.  
STUDY DESIGN 
This study summarizes one year of the active, sentinel surveillance system, including 
a six-month period of baseline data collection. The baseline data served as the 
comparison for the data collected during the test period. The baseline was also used to 
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establish thresholds for reporting events that occur at a frequency above normal, and to 
estimate seasonal patterns and illness trends among the participating sites. The test period 
served to validate the system. An overall mean was calculated, and a 30-day rolling mean 
was used to help reduce fluctuations in the data and to adjust for seasonal trends that 
might affect the analysis. Previous sentinel surveillance programs have been useful in 
providing information about strains, types, trends, and frequency of influenza in the 
community (10, 27).  
STUDY AREA AND POPULATION 
The surveillance sites were selected based on their risk of being a potential target of 
bioterrorism, their geographical proximity to the University, and their willingness to 
participate. The exact locations and names of the surveillance sites in this study will not 
be disclosed so that their identities will not be revealed. Government sources report that 
the theme parks and military facilities are at high risk for bio-threats (8). The parks are 
considered high-risk because they serve a diverse, global, and highly mobile population, 
and might be considered prime locations for terrorists to expose large groups of people to 
the biological agents. Due to varying incubation periods of biological pathogens, the 
identification of an attack might take time, especially at a theme park. Exposed persons 
may have returned to their respective countries and illnesses in multiple locations could 
mask the original exposure site. Therefore, patients might present to the theme park 
clinics with earlier and less severe symptoms compared to the time and severity of 
patients visiting an emergency department. Both types of healthcare settings were 
included to capture both situations. 
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Telephone and written communication was made to all participating institutions to 
assess their willingness to participate. The participating institutions were one military 
hospital and five clinics, two major theme parks, and one theme park referral hospital. 
For the purposes of maintaining site confidentiality, the theme parks will be called 
‘Theme Park A’ and ‘Theme Park B’. The park referral hospital will be called ‘Hospital 
X’ and the military facility called Military Clinics A-E. These clinics include pediatrics, 
internal medicine, family practice, and the emergency department. About 75% of the 
patients served at the theme park referral hospital are guests and employees of local 
theme parks.  
STUDY CONDITIONS 
The names of each site cannot be disclosed due to verbal and/or written 
confidentiality agreements. Approval for the study was obtained by a study description 
protocol submitted to the University of South Florida’s Institutional Review Board. The 
study was considered exempt, indicating that the study subjects were not identifiable by 
the information obtained as a part of this study. A copy of the Institutional Review Board 
approval letter and study protocol was provided to each surveillance site.  
SOURCES OF DATA 
Theme Park A is composed of a main clinic/first aid station and is staffed with 
nurses, paramedics, and other healthcare staff to provide care for park guests and 
employees. They also make referrals and transport severely ill patients to a local hospital. 
For every patient that visited the clinic with an illness, a data collection form was 
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completed. All injury-related illnesses were excluded. The data collection forms 
contained demographic information, a choice of syndromes, and a “no syndrome” option. 
The providers completed demographic information only for patients with a syndrome. 
The data entry person at this site was also a healthcare provider within interest in the 
study and requested to be the designated data entry person and site coordinator. Data 
were entered in as near real-time as possible into the secure Internet site. A few back-up 
data entry staff persons were designated during the absence of the site coordinator.  
Theme Park B 
Theme Park B was composed of three clinics/first aid stations, and the data entry 
took place at the administration office. Data collection forms were transferred every few 
hours or at 4:00pm each day. An administrative staff person served as the site coordinator 
and data entry person.  
Military Facility 
The military facility/hospital included five clinics, each responsible for designating 
personnel to enter their data. The public health staff in the facility served as an additional 
data entry point to help the clinics with data collection responsibilities. Data collection 
forms were collected multiple times every day by public health staff so that all forms 
could be archived. The Public Health Commander served as the site coordinator. The data 
collection forms were uniform at all the military clinics, but differed from the other 
surveillance sites. A total of 12 syndromes were selected for this site, based on a mandate 
from the Office of a Military Surgeon General, which stated that the site should assess for 
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specified syndromes for the purposes of bioterrorism detection in real-time and in all 
points of patient care. Our surveillance system provided the facility with surveillance 
tools that met and exceeded the guidelines set forth in the mandate. At the time of 
implementation, the military had their own bioterrorism surveillance system called 
ESSENCE that was provided at no cost. However, our system was selected because the 
data were able to be collected and reported in near real-time. The military surveillance 
system was based on ICD-9 codes which could take several hours to several weeks to be 
coded, preventing the system from capturing syndromes reported in near real-time (56).  
Hospital X.  
Hospital X was the theme park referral hospital that provided care for theme park 
guests and employees. Data collection forms were similar to the parks, but an additional 
question assessed which, of any, theme parks the patient visited within the past two 
weeks. Forms were completed for every patient that visited the emergency department. 
An administrative staff person in the emergency department was responsible for data 
entry. Back-up data entry persons included two emergency department administrative 
staff, and two research coordinators. In the beginning of the study, the site coordinator 
was the emergency department director, and later due to staff turnover, became the 
research coordinator.  
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STUDY IMPLEMENTATION 
Case Definitions 
Each syndrome was defined by a group of symptoms that are considered early 
indicators of most infectious diseases of public health importance and biological agent 
exposures. One of the purposes of this study was to assess baseline levels of each of the 
syndromes for the purposes of determining thresholds, specific for each syndrome, to 
serve as the comparison for detecting events occurring above normal frequencies during 
the test period. During the initiation of this study, before September 11, 2001, few 
syndromic surveillance systems existed. The literature from these studies did not include 
a standard list of infectious diseases and bioterrorism agents that the syndromes could 
represent. The information on possible illnesses indicated by the syndromes was 
considered necessary for training healthcare providers in this study. A list of possible 
infectious diseases and biological agents that could be identified through the syndromes 
was compiled (See Table 4).  
Two groups of syndromes were used; one specific for the military, and another for 
the theme parks. The syndrome list for all facilities except the military began as seven 
syndromes with a ‘No Syndrome’ option, but during the study an additional syndrome 
was added. The syndrome added was ‘influenza-like illness,’ and was added in August 
2002, at both theme parks and Hospital X for the purposes of assessing for flu season and 
West Nile Virus. The syndrome list at the military facility included the influenza-like 
illness. 
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• Upper or lower respiratory tract infection with fever 
o SARS, Respiratory Syncytial Virus, Pertussis, Inhalational Anthrax, 
Inhalational Glanders, 2nd state of Hantavirus, Inhalational Ricin 
exposure, Pneumonic Plague, etc. 
• Gastroenteritis 
o Plague, Tularemia, Hantavirus, Q Fever, E. coli, Giaria, Cryptosporidium, 
Shitgella, Oral Stapholococcus, Salmonella, Paralytic Shellfish Toxins, 
Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever, etc. 
• Rash with fever 
o Smallpox, Glanders, Monkeypox, etc. 
• Influenza-like illness 
o Smallpox, Anthrax, Brucellosis, Ebola, Hantavirus, Lassa Fever (most 
viral hemorrhagic fevers), 1st state of Q Fever, Tularemia, Influenza, West 
Nile Virus, Glanders, Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever, etc. 
• Encephalitis, meningitis, or unexplained acute encphalopathy/delirium 
o West Nile Virus, Japanese Encephalitis, St. Louis Encephalitis,  
Meningitis, etc.  
 
Table 4. Syndromes as Indicators of Infectious Diseases 
Data collection forms were developed by the investigator and customized for each 
site based on the information already being collected, discussions with providers, 
managers, and data entry staff. Data collection paper and web forms were customized 
based on the changing needs of the facilities, and for the purposes of maintaining a low 
provider burden. The web forms were identical to the paper forms so that data entry 
would be easy. A copy of each site’s web form is shown in Appendix A.  
Study Variables 
The demographic information collected varied by site. At all facilities, the 
demographic information was only collected on ‘syndromic’ reports. For all ‘no 
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syndrome’ reports, only the ‘date of patient visit’ was collected. If the patient presented 
with a syndrome, a series of non-identifying information was collected, including a 
hospital-coded identification number, date and time of visit, date of onset, date of birth, 
gender, zip code, country of residence, and the last four digits of social security number. 
A unique patient identification number and/or letter combination was assigned by each 
surveillance site that could only be used by sites to link the number/letter combination to 
the patient medical record. During an alert/warning of a possible event, the investigator 
reported the illness and the patient identification number for the purposes of rapidly 
retrieving medical records. The patient identification number was meaningless to the 
investigator, but provided a mechanism for enabling a rapid response by providing the 
surveillance site staff a quick link from surveillance data to more-inclusive medical 
records at the site, and could be useful if retrospective treatment was required. This 
number could not be used to identify the patient by anyone except staff at that site.  
The patient’s zip code was collected for future integration with a Geographic 
Information System to aid in data visualization, and cluster identification. Since it was 
possible that a patient could visit a theme park clinic and be transferred to Hospital X, 
making a double entry likely more for serious syndromes, the last four digits of patients’ 
social security numbers were collected and compared with the birth date and zip code to 
rule out duplicate reports of the same illness. For example, in the event that a patient 
visited a theme park clinic and was reported as having the sepsis syndrome, and 
transferred to Hospital X, the same patient would be reported twice. This would generate 
two alarms because of the severity of the syndrome and because all the sites had different 
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methods of assigning identification numbers, the system required a method of detecting 
duplicate reports. Since the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
(HIPAA) regulations went into affect on April 14, 2003, the last four digits of the social 
security number have not been collected, and new methods of detecting duplicate reports 
will be determined (57).  
Site-Specific Variables Collected 
The type of data collected varied by site. At Hospital X, there was a question added 
to the data collection form that assessed whether or not the patient had visited a theme 
park in the past two weeks, followed by a list of four main theme parks. At the military 
facility, travel history was assessed for patients that had traveled outside the U.S. in the 
past six months. At the theme parks, a question assessed for whether or not the patient 
was transported to a hospital. 
Data Collection Tool 
Several variations of the data collection forms were used and continually updated as 
requested by the surveillance sites (See Appendix A). Each form consisted of a short set 
of instructions at the top of each page to ensure proper form completion. A phone number 
of the site coordinator and the local health department were included at the bottom of the 
form.  
Introduction Meeting 
Introductory Meetings were held with investigators and key personnel at each of the 
sites, once they agreed to participate in the syndromic surveillance study. The site 
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planning staff usually included a director or executive-level staff member, clinic director, 
nurse, data entry staff person, and computer systems administrator. The study was 
presented and followed by a discussion of system integration strategies. Issues discussed 
were clinic and patient flow, system requirements, data collection, Internet accessibility, 
and any other concerns or questions from site staff. Copies of the presentation, study 
protocol, phone numbers for the investigator, and Institutional Review Board approval 
letters were provided to each site.  
Operations Meeting 
Once final corporate approval was obtained and staff members were ready to 
implement, the second meeting, the Operations Meeting, was held to plan and discuss 
final study implementation. A walk-through of most clinics helped determine best 
methods for integrating the system and to assess the current patient flow to identify 
insertion points for data collection forms, and the best method of transferring the forms 
for input. A designated basket marked ‘Health Surveillance Forms’ was identified, and 
was placed in a convenient location for providers for pick-up by the data entry person. 
The meeting concluded and the data entry person was given a user identification number 
and password to access the website, and received a brief training on data entry. The sites 
were provided with a hard copy and a floppy disc of the data collection tool. Colored 
paper of the site coordinators choosing was provided so that surveillance forms could be 
copied and easily identified from the other clinic forms. Study implementation began 
immediately or soon after the operations meeting was held. 
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Reporting Procedures 
When patients visited a surveillance site, a data collection form was placed on top of, 
or in the patient chart. During the patient visit, the healthcare provider determined the 
status of the illness and classified the patient as syndromic or nonsyndromic by marking 
the appropriate checkbox. If the provider reported a patient with a syndrome, 
demographic information on the patient was collected. If the patient did not present with 
one of the syndromes, the provider simply checked a box marked ‘no syndrome,’ and the 
forms were placed in the box marked ‘Health Surveillance Forms’ for data entry. A data 
collection form was completed for every patient visit at each site (excluding injuries at 
the theme parks only).  
Data Entry and Reporting Procedures 
The data collection forms were ideally entered as they were placed in the designated 
boxes; however, most of the sites collected the forms from the clinics at various intervals 
throughout the day. The data entry process consisted of logging onto a secure website 
that required a user identification number and password. Once the website was accessed, 
a VeriSign™ Certificate confirmed that they were reporting data to the Center for 
Biological Defense only. Then the staff selected the data entry screen for data entry, the 
appropriate syndrome was selected and demographic information entered before 
submitting the record. The nonsyndromic reports were counted and one entry was made 
after selecting the nonsyndromic option, the system prompted the user to record the date 
and the number of no syndrome reports. This option was added a few months after study 
implementation after a surveillance site staff person requested a mechanism to make it 
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easier to report nonsyndromic data. This method was offered by DataSphere, LLC, and 
saved time.  
Quality control was assessed at some clinics by comparing the total number of 
syndrome and no syndrome reports to daily clinic logs. This was only conducted a few 
times due to the difficulties and the amount of time it took for site staff to collect these 
numbers. The total number of daily reports should always equal the number of persons 
that visited each site that particular day, except for injury-related illnesses at the parks. 
This comparison was not possible for the theme parks because their daily clinic logs 
contained both illness and injury-related reports (without specifying illness or injury 
status), and for the purposes of this study, only illness-related data were collected.  
Efforts were made to assure the consistency of the data obtained. The following 
actions were taken to support the reliability of the data: training of healthcare providers 
on syndrome definitions and reporting procedures, training of data entry personnel on 
form completion and data entry, training and feedback meetings every three months to 
ensure awareness and knowledge of syndromes and reporting procedures, site-specific 
newletters, and continual updates on emerging diseases related to bioterrorism and 
infectious diseases. 
DATA MANAGEMENT  
The company that developed and maintained the software, and communicated with 
the investigator for rapid response to site technical requests was DataSphere, LLC. Data 
were entered into a secure database developed for the purposes of this study. The web 
forms were connected to a database so that when an authorized user logged onto the 
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website data could be securely submitted. All of the data were sent across public 
networks using 128-bit Secure Socket Layer encryption to protect the data by scrambling 
it during transmission, or making it meaningless if outside sources attempted to access 
the site. Data were stored in a Structured Query Language (SQL) Server database and 
resided on a Redundant Array of Inexpensive Disks (RAID) 5 data system to ensure that 
data were not lost due to hardware failure. Data back-ups were conducted daily to avoid 
data loss in the event of a system outage. The system was provided under an Application 
Service Provider (ASP) Software model to reduce costs and to ensure that data were 
backed up on a timely and routine schedule. The system enabled the option of providing 
a real-time copy of a given site’s data to a database server local to that facility so that the 
sites could keep their own data. A secure server then received the data, and as records 
were added to the database, a trigger initiated a query that calculated and compared the 
new syndromic data to the baseline for analysis. When the thresholds were exceeded, 
alerts and warnings were sent in near real-time to the investigator. When changes to the 
data were needed, such as a report was accidentally reported twice, system programmers 
edited the data only at the request of the investigator(s), and a record was kept of all 
changes to the data, along with the dates changes were made, and the user that requested 
them.  
Data Storage 
The data were stored in a standard method for a normalized relational database. 
While this format was not the same as the Center for Disease Control and Prevention’s 
National Electronic Disease Surveillance System 
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(NEDSS), customizable interfaces exist and are planned for future system use to provide 
mechanisms of data transfer to NEDSS, Health Level 7, and the State of Florida’s 
surveillance system called Merlin. 
Data Confidentiality 
Patient privacy and data confidentiality were maintained by limiting access only to 
personnel who needed direct access to the database. All other access to the database was 
completed through the system interface, which required each user to login using a 
username and password. A given username and password could access only the data 
designated for that user. 
Records Management 
All of the data were maintained within the system’s database and kept for the entire 
study period. Archiving was a possible feature provided primarily by the SQL Server, but 
was not needed in this study because the amount of data did not slow the performance of 
the system. If this were the case, as could be in the future, the database administrators 
will require specific policy changes requested, and the database management system 
software that would perform the task automatically.  
METHODS FOR ANALYSIS 
Once syndromic data were reported into the website, an automated analysis program 
was developed so that alerts and warnings could be issued in near real-time. The data 
from all surveillance sites were reported into the same system and accessed from a secure 
Internet site. This required a username and password, which was changed on several 
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occasions upon the investigator request. The Internet site housed several tabs that could 
be accessed to view different types of information. These tabs included an alert and 
warning list, a reporting page with customizable graphs and a syndrome frequency table, 
an entry detail list, and a notifications and device subscription listing, see Figures 2-6.  
 
Figure 2. Alert and warning page from the reporting tool. 
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Figure 3. Syndrome frequencies and graph from the reporting tool. 
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Figure 4. Entry details from the reporting tool. 
 71 
 
 Figure 5. Notification web screen from the reporting tool. 
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Figure 6. Device registering page for receiving alerts and warnings, contained in the 
reporting tool. 
Automated Analysis 
The syndrome frequencies were graphed over time and were listed in a table below 
the graph (See Figure 3). The graphing tool allowed the investigator to view each 
syndrome and total entry counts for individual and aggregated sites. Each syndrome was 
graphed against the 30-day rolling mean, and one or two or three standard deviations 
above the mean. These thresholds are based on the assumption of normality of the 
moving average. These values are justified because of the Central Limit Theorum applied 
to the moving average (58, 59). When a syndrome frequency measured between two and 
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three standard deviations from the mean, the system issued a warning to the investigator. 
When a syndrome frequency measured over three standard deviations above the mean, 
the system issued an alert. For example, we selected two and three standard deviations 
above the mean as the threshold for issuing a alerts and warnings, and aberrations in the 
influenza-like illness data were found to were true outbreaks, which validated these 
thresholds. The system could provide syndromic data in the form of rates and/or 
frequencies, but due to the high variation in daily total entries, only frequency data were 
used. The denominator was defined as the total number of entry counts, including 
syndromic and nonsyndromic data. Automated alerts were issued when any one case of a 
more serious syndrome was reported, including ‘rash with fever,’ ‘sepsis or non-
traumatic shock,’ ‘meningitis, encephalitis or unexplained acute 
encephalopathy/delirium,’ ‘botulism-like syndrome,’ and ‘unexplained death with history 
of fever.’ The option of reporting single cases of the more serious syndromes was 
provided to all surveillance sites, of which all chose to be notified during such an event. 
The option of changing the number of standard deviations could be completed within the 
notification page of the reporting tool, see Figure 5. 
Not all of the alerts and warnings that the system issued were reported to the sites. 
For example, some reports were entered into the database twice which could compromise 
the alerts and warnings. Also, during flu season, more respiratory alerts were issued by 
the system. The reporting tool contained an alert and warning page listed by individual 
site alert and/or by combined sites that made up alerts/warnings.  
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Graph 
The graphing tool allowed the investigator to view data in a user-friendly graph and 
tabular format by site or in the aggregate by specified dates, including syndromes 
graphed by week, month, all data, or custom graph, by rate or raw data. The total number 
of entry counts was another option and was used to measure the compliance of each site.  
ALERTS AND WARNINGS 
The alert and warning web page housed all alerts and warnings since study onset. An 
option was added that allowed the user to select any of the alerts or warnings. Once a 
specific alert/warning was selected, a report for that specific alert listed the data entry 
detail for each report, the facilities involved, the 60-day graph of the syndrome 
frequency, and a 60-day graph of total entry counts graphed against the means and 
standard deviations. The report also included information for contacting the site 
coordinators, and back-up secondary and tertiary contacts were listed in the event that the 
coordinators were not available. The demographic detail of each syndromic report that 
made up each alert facilitated rapid epidemiological links. Alerts/warnings could also be 
issued for increased and decreased total entry counts, however, due to the daily variation 
in total entry counts, not many of these alerts were issued, see Figure 2. 
Reporting Alerts and Warnings 
Once alerts and warnings were reported to surveillance sites, the sites were 
responsible for determining whether or not to report the health events to their local health 
department. The investigator reported alerts and warnings to the sites by phone or e-mail, 
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depending on the severity of the event. The site surveillance coordinator and the 
investigator usually worked together to confirm the event, first with data entry staff, then 
the coordinators initiated discussions with healthcare providers and made the final 
decision on whether or not to report the event to their local health department for further 
investigation.  
Entry Detail 
An entry detail tab on the reporting tool contained all case information on every 
syndrome that was reported to the system. This information included the site name, 
syndrome, patient identification number, specific clinic within each site, date of visit, 
date patient became ill, the date and time the syndrome was entered into the website, 
gender, birth date, zip code, country of residence, 60-day travel history (for military sites 
only), theme park guest or employee (if applicable), theme park(s) visited within the past 
two weeks (for theme park referral hospitals and clinics only), and theme park employee 
work location by department (if applicable). The theme park employee work location was 
a list provided by each theme park that helped further classify employees within the 
parks, including operations, culinary services, merchandising, animal training, 
zoological, engineering, maintenance, entertainment, administration, park services, 
warehouse, landscaping, and horticulture. This information was obtained for every 
syndromic case since the onset of the study period and can be accessed at any time from 
the investigator’s reporting tool.  
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Notifications 
An alert subscription page, as seen in Figure 5, was added to the reporting tool and 
designed by DataSphere so that the number of standard deviations could be altered to 
adjust the sensitivity of alerts/warnings. A notification tool was added so the investigator 
in the form of text messages could receive alerts/warnings. These text messages were 
sent to electronic devices, such as pagers, mobile phones, and email, or other personal 
digital assistant, such as the pocket PC phone used in this study. These web-based tools 
provided the option of selecting the syndrome, site, standard deviation and/or notification 
device in which to receive alerts and warnings in near real-time. A list of every 
subscription by user could be viewed and deleted if the analysis parameters appeared to 
be too sensitive or not sensitive enough. These tools were useful in decreasing the 
sensitivity during times of known outbreaks, such as flu season, so that alerts would 
occur daily. This also provided a method for immediate alerts with one report of a serious 
syndrome, such as botulism-like syndrome. 
Device 
The ‘device’ page of the reporting tool shown in Figure 6 allowed the investigator to 
register a personal digital assistant that received email, such as pagers, mobile phones, 
and pocket PC phones in which to receive alert/warning notifications. The user specified 
the name, type, and address of the device.  
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System Changes/Adaptations 
 ‘Influenza-like illness’ syndrome was added in August to assess for potential West 
Nile Virus and influenza season, and was integrated at the time for traditional influenza 
surveillance, October to May. This syndrome can also be an important indicator of early 
exposure to bioterrorism agents and other infectious diseases. Midway through the study, 
the reporting tool containing the alert and warning listing, entry detail list, notification 
list, and device listing was offered to the sites that had public health officials or 
epidemiologists on staff to help interpret data. Each facility that was offered access to 
their own reporting tool could only view their own data. The military facility and 
Hospital X were offered and accepted access to their data and the reporting tool.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS 
But we are at war now and this is not business-as-usual,  
we have to do things at a speed that has never been done before. 
—Fauci 
 
The entire study was planned for one year, including a six-month period of baseline 
data collection. The yearlong study period was decreased by five weeks due to changes in 
reporting requirements by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996 (57). This analysis includes data reported from May 29, 2002 – April 13, 2003, with 
the baseline period running from May 29, 2002 – November 29, 2002. The test period 
was November 30, 2002 – April 13, 2003. The baseline period and test period were 
compared to determine thresholds for reporting syndromic alerts and/or warnings. This 
analysis includes data reported from first aid stations/clinics at two major theme parks, 
one theme park referral hospital emergency department, and one military hospital 
comprised of four clinics and one emergency department. For the purposes of 
confidentiality, the actual names of the surveillance sites are be reported, but are referred 
to as ‘Hospital X’, ‘Military Clinics A-E’, ‘Theme Park A,’ and ‘Theme Park B’.  
Overall Data Analysis 
The study was conducted for 47 weeks, with a total of 34,664 syndromic and non-
syndromic total reports. The baseline study period consisted of 26 weeks, or 16,327 total 
entries, and the test period was conducted for of 21 weeks with 18,337 total entries.  
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Syndromic Distribution 
A total of 2,296 syndromes (6.6% of all data) and 32,368 “no syndromes” (93.4% of 
all data) were reported. There were 693 syndromes reported during the baseline, and 
1,603 reported during the test period. During the overall study, the syndromic distribution 
by site was composed of 1,351 reports from the military facility, and 673 reports from 
Hospital X, as seen in Figure 7. The theme park clinics reported fewer patients overall 
compared to the military facility and Hospital X.  
Syndromic Distribution by Facility
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Figure 7. Syndromic Distribution by Facility 
Overview of Syndromes Reported 
Figures 8-17 show graphs of each syndrome reported weekly for the overall study 
period. The most frequently reported syndromes triggering alerts and/or warnings were 
gastroenteritis, respiratory tract infection with fever, and influenza-like illness. A 
significant increase in gastroenteritis reports was identified on October 30, 2002, and 
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continued until April 29, 2003, as shown in Figure 10. There were few overall reports of 
fever of undetermined origin (this syndrome was only collected at the military facility), 
with more reports during the baseline period, shown in Figure 16. Respiratory tract 
infection with fever, influenza-like illness, and febrile illness (febrile illness collected 
only at the military facility) rapidly increased during the test period, as seen in Figures 8, 
9, and 17. The respiratory tract infection with fever and influenza-like illness syndromes 
increased significantly on November 7 and 11, 2002. The febrile illness syndrome 
increased during the end of October 2002. Rash with fever reports were generally 
constant throughout the overall study period, peaking once during the baseline and once 
during the test period, but the numbers were small, as seen in Figure 11. Figure 12 shows 
contact dermatitis (a military-only syndrome) reports, which appeared to be reported in 
clusters, one during the baseline and another one during the test period, but the numbers 
were low. No reports of the “influenza” syndrome (a military-only syndrome) during the 
baseline period, and only a few were reported during the test period, as shown in Figure 
13. The “influenza” syndrome was mandatory for the military to collect, but probably 
was not reported by providers because an accurate report of this syndrome would require 
a laboratory confirmation. This “influenza” syndrome was not assessed at any other 
facility. 
Figure 14 shows the encephalitis/meningitis-like syndromic reports, which were 
mostly constant during the study period, with only ten total reports. There were only five 
cases of the non-traumatic shock/sepsis syndrome during the entire study period, and all 
five cases reported were during the test period, as can be seen in Figure 15. There were 
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five reports of death with fever and one botulism-like syndrome reported during the 
entire study period, all of which were misreported.  
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Figure 8. Respiratory tract infection with fever weekly reports. 
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Overall Study Period
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Figure 9. Influenza-like illness weekly reports. 
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Overall Study Period
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Figure 10. Gastroenteritis weekly reports. 
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Overall Study Period
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Figure 11. Rash with fever weekly reports 
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Overall Study Period
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Figure 12. Contact dermatitis weekly reports. 
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Overall Study Period
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Figure 13. Influenza weekly reports. 
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Overall Study Period
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Figure 14. Encephalitis/meningitis weekly reports. 
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Overall Study Period
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Figure 15. Shock/sepsis weekly reports. 
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Overall Study Period
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Figure 16. Fever of unknown origin weekly reports. 
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Overall Study Period
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Figure 17. Febrile illness weekly reports. 
Overall Entry Counts 
The total number of entry counts (including syndromic and non-syndromic data) 
increased over time, and can be seen in Figure 18. Figure 19 shows the distribution of 
total entry counts by facility. Theme Park B reports were more consistent compared to 
the other sites. Hospital X’s participation increased over time, as did the military facility. 
Reporting from Theme Park A declined over time.  
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Total Entry Counts for all Facilities, May 29, 2002- April 21, 2003
 
Figure 18. Total entry counts for all facilities, May 29, 2002- April 21, 2003 
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Figure 19. Total Entry Counts by Facility 
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Figure 20 shows the total number of entry counts (syndromic and nonsyndromic) 
reported from the military hospital by clinic. Clinics A and C had the highest number of 
total entries. Reporting in all the clinics was mandatory, but not enforced, except in 
Clinic A.  
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Figure 20. Total Entry Counts  
Figure 21 shows the total weekly entry counts for all facilities during the study 
period. Overall, reporting increased over time, and was highest during the second week 
of December. This graph shows the increase in compliance, which was probably 
attributed in part to customizing the system, providing feedback and training meetings 
and overall increased awareness of the study among providers.  
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Figure 21. Total Entry Counts by Week  
Syndromic Frequencies 
Figure 22 shows the percentages of each syndrome in proportion to all syndromic 
reports (2296). The most frequently reported syndromes for all sites combined during the 
overall study period, were gastroenteritis with 898 reports (39.11%), upper/lower 
respiratory tract infection with fever with 636 reports (27.7%), influenza-like illness at 
386 reports (16.81%), and febrile illness with 208 reports (9.06% at military facility). 
The influenza-like illness was added in mid-September to be able to assess for West Nile 
Virus and flu season. There were 57 reports (2.48%) of fever of undetermined origin, 38 
reports (1.66%) of rash with fever, 30 reports (1.31%) of contact dermatitis, 28 reports 
(1.22%) of influenza, 10 reports (0.44%) of encephalitis/meningitis, and 5 (0.22%) 
shock/sepsis reports. 
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Figure 22. Total syndromes reported during overall study period. 
DEMOGRAPHICS 
The demographic information collected as a part of this study included age, gender, 
and zip code. This information was only gathered on patients that presented with a 
syndrome. In order to keep the provider burden low, no demographic information was 
collected on the ‘no syndrome’ reports, (93.4% of all data). In addition, it was decided 
that data entry persons spent too much time entering each “no syndrome” report. 
Therefore, all non-syndromic data were entered by clicking on the “no syndrome” option 
on the website, and typing in the total number of “no syndrome” reports for that period. 
These changes resulted in a significant decrease in the provider and data entry personnel 
workload since 93% of all reports were non-syndromic. Since the implementation of this 
study, other syndromic surveillance systems have implemented this feature, suggesting 
the impact that this study has had on other bioterrorism surveillance systems outside this 
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study. The theme park reports were divided into guest or employee categories, and for the 
employee reports, the department in which they worked was also assessed. Theme park A 
consisted of seven departments and Theme Park B had 10 departments.  
Military Travel History 
At the military facility, recent travel history was assessed for patients that presented 
with a syndrome for the purpose of serving as a potential epidemiological link in the 
event of a biological release during combat in other countries. A total of 186 patients 
reported recent travel outside the U.S., and some reports were classified. A complete 
listing of countries where patients at the military facility reported recent travel cannot be 
shown due to the sensitivity of the information, but the most frequently reported 
countries visited were Germany, Afghanistan, Puerto Rico, Mexico, and Qatar. No links 
or potential exposures were identified during this study with any one syndrome or 
country. 
Hospital X’s Theme Park Visit History 
Patients that presented with a syndrome at Hospital X were also asked if they had 
visited one of four major parks in the Central Florida area during the past two weeks. The 
most frequently visited parks visited were Disney World (97), Sea World (10), Universal 
Studios (7), and Busch Gardens (2). Busch Gardens is geographically located further 
from Hospital X than any of the other listed theme parks. 
 96 
Country of Origin for Theme Parks & Hospital X Visitors 
At both theme parks and Hospital X, the country of origin was reported for all 
patients with a reported syndrome. At Theme Park A, the most frequently reported 
country (excluding the U.S.) was the United Kingdom. For Theme Park B, the most 
frequently reported countries were United Kingdom and Puerto Rico. When combined, 
the overall most frequently reported countries of origin were the United Kingdom, 
Canada, and Puerto Rico, as seen in Table 5. 
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Site Country Frequency  Totals 
Theme Park A US 97  Country Frequency 
  UK 4  Brazil 1 
  Costa Rica 1  Canada 29 
  Mexico 1  Colombia 2 
  Puerto Rico 1  Costa Rica 2 
  Spain 1  Denmark 1 
  Total 105  Germany 1 
Theme Park B US 136  Mexico 3 
  UK 21  Peru 1 
  Puerto Rico 3  Puerto Rico 5 
  Canada 2  Spain 1 
  Colombia 2  UK 46 
  Denmark 1  US 851 
  Germany 1  SriLanka 1 
  Peru 1  Japan 1 
  Total 167  Total 945 
Hospital X US 618    
  UK 21    
  Brazil 1    
  Canada 27    
  Costa Rica 1    
  Japan 1    
  Mexico 2    
  Puerto Rico 1    
  Sri Lanka 1    
  Total 673    
        
Site Totals   945    
Table 5. Country Listing of Visitors from Theme Park A, Theme Park B, & Hospital X 
Age Distribution 
Birth date was assessed, but for the purposes of aggregating data in this analysis, 
birth dates were converted to age. Since it was probable that the theme parks served a 
younger population, two different analyses on age were performed, one for the adult age 
and another for youth (See Figures 24, 25). The age groups used in this analysis were 
 98 
defined by standard age groups used in previous studies (60, 61). These age groups were 
consistently used for all sites. 
As can be seen from Figure 23, there were significantly more reports in the 0-14 age 
group compared to the others. The next largest group was the 25-44 age group. When the 
18 and under data were further stratified, there were significantly more reports in the 0-6 
age group, as shown in Figure 25.  
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Figure 23. Overall Age Distribution of Syndromic Data 
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Figure 24. Overall Youth Age Distribution Syndromic Data 
Age Stratified by Facility 
Figure 25 shows that when the syndromic data were stratified by age and facility, 
there were significantly more reports from the military in the 0-14 age group. There were 
fewest reports in the 65 and over age group.  
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Figure 25. Overall Age Distribution by Facility 
Figure 26 shows the youth age stratified by facility. The military facility and 
Hospital X had more reports in the 0-6 age group.  
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Figure 26. Youth Age Distribution by Facility 
Syndrome Stratified by Age 
Figures 27 and 28 show syndromes stratified by the overall and youth age groups. 
The major differences were that the respiratory tract infection, gastroenteritis, influenza-
like illness, rash with fever, febrile illness, and fever of undetermined origin syndromes 
were much higher in the 0-14 age group compared to other age groups. Gastroenteritis 
was also high for the 25-44 age group compared to other groups. 
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Figure 27. Overall Age Distribution by Syndrome 
When syndromes were stratified by youth age group, the respiratory tract infection, 
gastroenteritis, influenza-like illness, febrile illness, fever of undetermined origin, and 
rash with fever syndromes were all much higher among the 0-6 age group compared to 
the other groups. The frequency of reports of the contact dermatitis, influenza, and 
encephalitis/meningitis-like syndromes were slightly higher among the 0-6 age group 
compared to the other groups. There were no shock/sepsis reports among any of the 
youth age groups. 
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Figure 28. Youth Age Distribution by Syndrome 
Syndromes Stratified by Baseline vs. Test Period by Site 
Appendix F contains supplemental graphs that accompany this text. The respiratory 
tract infection with fever, gastroenteritis, and influenza-like illness syndromes were 
higher during the test period than the baseline at the military facility and Hospital X. 
Rash with fever was higher during the test period at the military clinics, and Hospital X, 
and more frequent in the baseline at Theme Park A (probably due to a local outbreak of 
Fifth’s Disease that was detected by the surveillance system). Contact dermatitis was 
reported only at the military facility, and remained about the same in both periods. There 
were few overall reports of the encephalitis/meningitis-like syndrome, and no trend was 
seen during either period. All cases of the shock/sepsis-like syndrome were reported 
during the test period and were reported only at the military and Hospital X emergency 
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departments. The influenza reports from the military facility were all reported during the 
test period. Febrile illness reports from the military were consistently higher during the 
test period compared to baseline. There were more reports of fever of undetermined 
origin during the baseline period at the military facility compared to the test period, but 
again, the numbers were very small. 
Syndrome Stratified by Month 
Appendix B contains supplemental graphs that correspond to this section. 
Gastroenteritis reports were relatively steady until the end of October 2002, when 
significant increases were detected and continued increasing until March 2003. 
Respiratory tract infection and influenza-like illness reports were relatively consistent 
until November 2002, when both began increasing, peaking in December and January. 
Febrile illness reports increased steadily throughout the study, and were highest in 
January. Rash with fever reports were highest during July 2002, and January 2003. 
Contact dermatitis reports were similar, and peaked during May, June, and July 2002, 
and again in mid-November thru mid-December, however, the number of reports was 
small. Influenza reports peaked in February. Reports for fever of undetermined origin 
were highest in May through July 2002, peaking in December 2002, and March 2003. 
Overall, there were fewer reports of fever of undetermined origin than most of the other 
syndromes. There was a small cluster of encephalitis/meningitis-like syndrome reports in 
July. All the shock/sepsis syndromes were reported January through April 2003, with 
most cases occurring during February and March 2003. 
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Gender 
Of the 2,296 syndromic reports, the gender distribution was almost equal, with 49% 
male and 51% female, as shown in Figure 29. Gender was stratified by site and no 
significant differences were observed. 
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 Figure 29. Overall Gender Distribution 
Syndrome Stratified by Gender 
When syndromes were stratified by gender, there were no significant differences 
between males and females any syndrome except gastroenteritis, with more women 
reported than men (497, 401), as shown in Figure 30.  
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Figure 30. Gender Distribution by Syndrome 
Syndromes Stratified by Site 
Appendix C contains supplemental graphs that correspond to this section. Increases 
in the respiratory tract infection, gastroenteritis, influenza-like illness, rash with fever, 
shock/sepsis, and encephalitis/meningitis-like syndromes were all detected at the military 
facility clinics one month or more before increases were detected at Hospital X’s 
emergency department. Increases in gastroenteritis were detected at the clinics (theme 
park and military clinics) more than two months before increases were seen at both 
emergency departments (Hospital X and military).  
Syndromes Stratified by Theme Parks A and B by Employee Department 
Among employees of both theme parks, more syndromes were reported by three 
departments, including operations, culinary/food services, and merchandising; however, 
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these three departments were the largest overall distribution of employee departments at 
both parks. At Theme Park B, the three largest departments were food services (28% of 
employees), operations (22%), and merchandising (14%). When syndromes were 
grouped by department at Theme Park B, 38% of the syndromes were from employees 
that worked in the operations department, 25% in food services, and 11% in 
merchandising. At Theme Park A, the employee distribution across departments was 
34%, culinary services 24%, and merchandising 14%. Thirty-four percent of syndromes 
were reported from operations, 30% from culinary services, and 14% from 
merchandising at Theme Park A. The similarities of syndrome reports at both parks 
appear to be consistent with the employee distribution, suggesting that this study has a 
representative sample of employees from both parks. See Appendix D for employee and 
syndromic distributions by departments at both parks.  
Baseline Period Data Analysis 
Baseline data collection was conducted during the first six months of the study, or 26 
weeks, from May 29, 2002 – November 29, 2002. This baseline period was used to 
establish thresholds for defining alerts and warnings during the test period. During this 
period, there were 16,327 total reports, including 693 syndromes and 15,634 “no 
syndromes.” Of the total, 3,768 were reported from Hospital X, 7,859 from Military 
Clinics A-E, 231 from Theme Park A, and 4,469 from Theme Park B. The most 
frequently reported syndromes during the baseline period were gastroenteritis, respiratory 
tract infection, febrile illness, and influenza-like illness. Respiratory tract infection, 
gastroenteritis, influenza-like illness, and rash with fever were all reported more 
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frequently during the test period than at baseline. Please refer to Appendix E for 
supplemental graphs for this section. 
Baseline Period at Military Facility 
During the baseline period at the military facility, there were no cases of 
shock/sepsis reported. There were three cases of encephalitis/meningitis-like syndrome 
reported during June and July. When the baseline reports were compared to the test 
period, overall the baseline had fewer reports of every syndrome except for the 
encephalitis/meningitis-like syndrome and the fever of undetermined origin syndrome. 
Appendix F supplements all site-specific observations related to the baseline data 
analysis. 
Baseline Period at Hospital X 
Reports from Hospital X during the baseline period showed no reports of 
shock/sepsis, very few of the respiratory tract infection with fever syndrome, one report 
of rash with fever, few reports of influenza-like illness, low but relatively steady reports 
of gastroenteritis, and only one report of the encephalitis/meningitis-like syndrome. No 
one syndrome was reported more during the baseline than the test period. Hospital X had 
lower total entries during the baseline compared to the test period.  
Baseline Period at Theme Park B 
Only a few cases of respiratory tract infection with fever were reported during the 
baseline. Equal amounts of rash with fever were reported during the baseline and test 
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periods. There were no reports of the encephalitis/meningitis-like syndrome. No one 
syndrome was reported more during the baseline compared to the test period.  
Baseline Period at Theme Park A 
The baseline at Theme Park A showed few, but consistent reports of respiratory tract 
infection with fever. The rash with fever and gastroenteritis syndromes were reported 
more often during the baseline than during the test period. 
Test Period Data Analysis 
The test period was conducted for 20 weeks from November 30, 2002 – April 13, 
2003. The total number of records reported during this period was 18,337, including 
1,603 syndromes and 16,734 “no syndromes.” Of the total reports, 4,661 were reported 
from Hospital X, 10,949 from Military Clinics A-E, 170 from Theme Park A, and 2,557 
from Theme Park B. The most frequently reported syndromes were gastroenteritis, 
respiratory tract infection, and influenza-like illness. Respiratory tract infection, 
gastroenteritis, and influenza-like illness, were more frequently reported during the test 
period, as shown in Figures 31-33. The influenza-like illness syndrome was more 
frequently reported during the test period, partly due to the late addition of this syndrome 
to the surveillance system. Rash with fever varied during the baseline and the test 
periods. The few cases of shock/sepsis were all reported during the test period. Appendix 
E contains additional graphs for this paragraph. 
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Figure 31. Baseline vs. Test Period Respiratory tract infection with fever Reported 
Weekly. 
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Figure 32. Baseline vs. test period gastroenteritis frequency reported weekly. 
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Figure 33. Baseline vs. test period influenza-like illness reported weekly.  
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Test Period for Military Facility 
At the military facility, the respiratory tract infection with fever, gastroenteritis, 
influenza-like illness, rash with fever, shock/sepsis, influenza, and febrile illness 
syndromes were more frequently reported during test period compared to the baseline, 
see Figures 34-40). The gastroenteritis and influenza-like illness reports were the highest 
in December 2002, continuing through February 2003. All of the influenza syndrome 
were reported during the test period, and highest during February 2003. Febrile illness 
remained high during the test period, peaking in January 2003. The fever of 
undetermined origin reports were more frequent during the earlier part of the test period, 
from November through February 2003, but were lower during the baseline. Appendix F 
contains graphs for this section. 
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Figure 34. Baseline and test period reports of respiratory tract infection with fever 
reported from the military facility. 
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Figure 35. Baseline and test period reports of gastroenteritis reported from the military 
facility. 
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Figure 36. Baseline and test period reports of influenza-like illness reported from the 
military facility. 
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Figure 37. Baseline and test period reports of rash with fever reported from the military 
facility. 
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Figure 38. Baseline and test period reports of shock/sepsis reported from the military 
facility. 
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Figure 39. Baseline and test period reports of influenza reported from the military 
facility. 
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Figure 40. Baseline and test period reports of febrile illness reported from the military 
facility. 
Test Period for Hospital X 
At Hospital X, the respiratory tract infection with fever, gastroenteritis, influenza-
like illness, rash with fever, encephalitis/meningitis, and shock/sepsis syndromes were 
reported more often during the test period than the baseline period, see Figures 41-46. 
The largest peak of the respiratory tract infection with fever syndrome occurred in 
February 2003. Gastroenteritis and influenza-like illness reports were highest during 
February and March 2003. There were few reports of rash with fever, 
encephalitis/meningitis, and shock/sepsis during the test period.  
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Figure 41. Baseline and test period reports of respiratory tract infection with fever 
reported from Hospital X. 
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Figure 42. Baseline and test period gastroenteritis reported from Hospital X. 
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Figure 43. Baseline and test period reports of influenza-like illness at Hospital X. 
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Figure 44. Baseline and test period reports of rash with fever at Hospital X.  
 
 124 
Baseline vs. Test Period
"Encephalopathy/Meningitis" 
at Hospital X
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
Week
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Baseline
Test Period
 
Figure 45. Baseline and test period reports of encephalitis/meningitis syndrome at 
Hospital X.  
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Figure 46. Baseline and test period reports of shock/sepsis at Hospital X.  
Test Period for Theme Park A 
There was one large peak of the respiratory tract infection syndrome during March 
2003, see Figure 47. Gastroenteritis reports increased during December and January, as 
can be seen in Figure 48. There were no other significant differences of syndromes 
reported during the test period. See Appendix F for graphs corresponding to this section. 
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Figure 47. Baseline and test period reports of respiratory tract infection with fever at 
Theme Park A. 
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Figure 48. Baseline and test period reports of gastroenteritis at Theme Park A. 
Test Period for Theme Park B 
There were two significant increases of gastroenteritis during the test period during 
the months of January and April, see Figure 49. For additional graphs of Theme Park B, 
refer to Appendix F. 
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Figure 49. Baseline and test period reports of gastroenteritis at Theme Park B. 
EVALUATION OF SYSTEM 
The system was measured using the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s 
recommendations for evaluating syndromic surveillance systems. The criteria measured 
included identifying the purpose, the usefulness to stakeholders, and the operational 
procedures during the study implementation period (3).  
Recruitment of surveillance sites was difficult before the September 11 attacks, 
probably due to the low perceived risk of a terrorist attack occurring in the U.S. The sites 
appeared to be more willing to participate after the attacks because the threat of a 
biological attack was likely perceived as real. Hospital X was the most difficult site to 
recruit, potentially because it was a busy emergency department. Of the sites that agreed 
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to participate, they reportedly did so in order to protect their guests, employees and 
community. The overall compliance with reporting increased throughout the study 
period. The purpose of the study was to serve as a ‘watchdog’ for identifying unusual 
illness patterns that could be indicators of biological agent exposure for high-risk 
facilities in the Central Florida area. The goal was achieved, as the system detected 
several clusters of illness in the community.  
Stakeholders 
The stakeholders at the sites reported being satisfied with the system and plan to 
continue syndromic surveillance utilizing the BioDefend™ system. Once training and 
feedback meetings were conducted for healthcare providers at the surveillance sites, it 
appeared that they had a better understanding of the need to report syndromic data. There 
was not much resistance to report data at the theme parks, but some resistance was 
encountered in one busy military clinic. Due to staff turnover at Hospital X, problems 
were encountered in reporting during the first half of the study, but as the issues were 
resolved, reporting increased. The overall support of this study by the sites was 
satisfactory in the beginning, improved over time, and increased training and feedback 
meetings were held.  
SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS 
The alerts and warnings were divided into a five categories, including the following: 
individual facility alerts/warnings; syndromic increase at some or all of the sites called 
combined alerts/warnings; facility-requested alerts/warning of any one case of a serious 
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syndrome; and significant increases and/or decreases in the total number of entries at any 
one facility. See Tables 6 and 7 for the syndromic alert/warning report.  
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Number Date Syndrome (confirmed frequency) Useful Information for 
Epi Links 
Action (See text for 
additional military actions) 
Lessons Learned 
1 6/15/02  Gastroenteritis (5) 4 Employee, 1 guest; 2 
emplyees were from the 
same department 
Site investigation (SI), 
Medical Record Review 
(MRR), Provider Discussion 
(PD)  
 
2 7/10/02 Encephephalitis/mening (1) Employee SI, MRR, PD  
3 7/16/02 Encephephalitis/mening (1) Child SI, MRR, PD  
4 7/22/02 Rash with fever (4) All children from 
outside U.S. 
SI, MRR, PD  Later believed to be part of a local Fifth’s Disease 
outbreak among children. 
5 7/23/02 Encephephalitis/mening (1) Visit from previous 
child from 7/16 
MRR  Identification number entered incorrectly or system would 
have detected cases reported within the past 30 days. 
6 8/13/02 Death with Fever (1) Miss report   
7 8/14/02 Death with Fever (1) Miss report   
8 8/14/02 Botulism (1) Miss report   
9 8/21/02 Encephephalitis/mening (1) Child SI, MRR, PD. Case was later 
confirmed as viral meningitis. 
System detected true case of meningitis in near real-time!!  
10 8/24/02 Gastroenteritis (5) 3 Guests, 2 Employees; 
All cases under 18; 1 
Reported motion 
sickness; 3 Vomiting; 1 
from UK 
SI, MRR, PD; Continued 
watching for more reports. 
 
11 9/12/02 Rash with fever (1)  SI, MRR, PD  
12 10/1/02 Rash with fever (1) Site called this report in 
& referred patient to 
hospital. The nurse 
reported this as a 
potential measles case.  
SI, MRR, PD;  
Patient referred to hospital. 
Investigator encouraged 
provider to follow-up and 
discussed measles as 
mandatory report to local 
health department.  
 
13 
 
11/13/02 Encephephalitis/mening (1)  SI, MRR Data were reported too late. 
14 11/25/02 Encephephalitis/mening (1)  SI, MRR, PD   
15 11/25/02 Respiratory tract infection with 
fever (5) 
All under 18; All from 2 
related clinics 
SI, MRR, PD; Public health 
commander recommends all 
providers give flu shots to all 
or most patients. 
 
Table 6. Alert and Warning Report: Baseline Period 
1
3
0
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16 11/26/02 Gastroenteritis (4) Five cases reported, but 
one reported twice. 
SI, MRR, PD Site was alerted also on this day with more than its normal 
total entries. One double entry.  
17 11/26/02 Respiratory tract infection (8) 3 reports within same 
zip code, mostly adults, 
one with recent travel 
history. 
SI, MRR, PD Site was alerted also on this day with more than its normal 
total entries. Alerts 13 & 14 could be attributed to increase 
in overall entries, or the increase in entries might be 
attributed to more patients reporting to the facility. 
18 11/27/02 Gastroenteritis (6) 3 from same zip, 2 
double entries, 2 from 
same family 
SI, MRR, PD Two double entries. Notified facility of trouble with 
entering correct patient identification numbers. 
19 11/27/02 Respiratory tract infection (7) 4 Children, 3 adults, 
most reports from same 
clinic. 
Military public health officer 
sent email to all providers to 
give flu shots to all patients. 
 
20 11/27/02 Gastroenteritis (9) On 11/26, 6 cases 
reported when sites 
were combined.  
Reported, outcome unknown. Reporting alerts during baseline was difficult due to no set 
threshold to report an event. 
Table 6. Alert and Warning Report: Baseline Period (Continued) 
1
3
1
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Number Date Syndrome (confirmed 
frequency) 
Facility Useful Information for 
Epi Links 
Action (See text for 
additional military actions)  
Lessons Learned 
1 12/2/02 Respiratory tract infection (8) Military  SI, MRR, PD An alert was also issued to this facility regarding 
increased entries.  
2 12/3/02 Influenza-like illness (9) Military Mostly middle-aged. SI, MRR, PD; Alert email 
sent to all providers. 
 
3 12/3/02  Gastroenteritis (7) Military  SI, MRR, PD  
4 12/5/02 Encephalitis/meningitis (1) Military  SI, MRR, PD  
5 12/8/02 Gastroenteritis (3) Park A 2 Employees, all female. SI, MRR, PD. No major link 
apparent. 
 
6 12/13/02 Rash with fever (1) Military  SI, MRR, PD; Site 
investigation showed all 
were employees, did not 
appear to be related. 
 
7 12/17/02 Gastroenteritis (6) Com- 
bined 
7 Reports, 1 double 
entry. 
Reported, outcome 
unknown. 
1 double entry. 
8 12/20/02 Respiratory tract infection with 
fever (10) 
Military 1 with recent travel 
history, 3 with same zip, 
mostly children. 
SI, MRR, PD  
9 12/30/02 Influenza-like illness (5) Military 1 with recent travel 
history. 
SI, MRR, PD  
10 1/10/03 Gastroenteritis (8) Com-
bined 
3 with recent travel 
history, two of which are 
same countries. 
Reported, outcome 
unknown. 
2 double entries. 
11 1/10/03 Shock/sepsis (1) Military  SI, MRR, PD.  
12 1/10/03 Rash with fever (1) Military  SI, MRR, PD  
13 1/11/03 Rash with fever (1) Military  SI, MRR, PD  
14 1/18/03 Death with fever (0) Military 3 Cases reported, 
possible misreported 
from provider. 
SI, MRR, PD False positive, no actual deaths. 
15 1/21/03 Respiratory tract infection (7) Military 3 with same zip, most 
under 18. 
SI, MRR, PD  
16 1/22/03 Gastroenteritis (9) Com-
bined 
2 reports with same zip. Reported, outcomes 
unknown. 
 
Table 7. Alert and Warning Report: Test Period. 
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17 1/23/03 Gastroenteritis (3) Park B 2 emp, both food svcs, 
same zip, fem 
SI, MRR, PD, Reported to 
directors, and kept watch  
Near real-time epi info useful to quickly link 
cases.  
18 1/27/03 Respiratory tract infection with 
fever (9) 
Military All young, most from one 
of two zip codes.  
SI, MRR, PD Alert issued for this facility regarding increased 
entries. 
19 1/30/03 Gastroenteritis (7) Com-
bined 
3 employees from one 
park from same 
department; 1 with recent 
military travel. 
SI, MRR, PD, Discussed 
with health director at one 
park with most of cases. 
Outcome unknown. 
 
20 2/2/03 Encephalitis/meningitis (1) Hospital 
X 
 Reported to site, outcome 
unknown. 
 
21 2/5/03 Gastroenteritis (9) Hospital 
X 
4 recent park visitors (2 
different parks), 6 were 
young. 
Reported to site, outcome 
unknown. 
 
22 2/11/03 Gastroenteritis (13) Com-
bined 
No apparent links. Reported, unknown 
outcome. 
 
23 2/11/03 Respiratory tract infection with 
fever (12) 
Com-
bined 
No apparent links. Reported, unknown 
outcome. 
 
24 2/12/03 Shock/sepsis (1) Hospital 
X 
 SI, MRR.  
25 2/16/03 Encephalitis/mening (1) Hospital 
X 
 Reported to site, outcome 
unknown. 
 
26 2/17/03 Gastroenteritis (11) Hospital 
X 
4 were previous park 
visitors at the same park. 
Reported to site. The patients with reported GI distress were all 
recent visitors of one theme park. This theme park 
was not included in the study, by choice. This 
shows that by including the hospital caring for its 
guests & employees, one can still conduct partial 
surveillance of that facility.  
27 2/17/03 Gastroenteritis (13) Com-
bined 
 Reported to sites with most 
cases, outcome unknown. 
 
28 2/18/03 Gastroenteritis (14) Com-
bined 
Military & hospital X 
reported most cases. 
Reported to sites, outcome 
unknown. 
 
29 2/27/03 Influenza-like illness (9) Com-
bined 
 Reported to sites, outcome 
unknown. 
Investigator sent alerts of recent increase in ILI & 
GI with de-identified graph to sites, local health 
department, & CDC. 
30 3/1/03 Shock/sepsis (1) Military  SI, MRR, PD  
Table 7. Alert and Warning Report: Test Period (Coninued) 
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31 3/4/03 Gastroenteritis (14) Com-
bined 
 Reported, outcome 
unknown. 
 
32 3/11/03 Respiratory tract infection with 
fever (8) 
Com-
bined 
Mostly children. Reported, outcome 
unknown. 
 
33 3/15/03 Shock/sepsis (1) Hospital 
X 
 Reported, outcome 
unknown. 
 
34 3/16/03 Influenza-like illness (9) Com-
bined 
11 Reports, 2 cases 
double entered. 
Reported, outcome 
unknown. 
11 cases reported, after identifying 2 double 
entries, 9 cases reported. 
35 3/21/03 Shock/sepsis (1) Hospital 
X 
Not entered in near real-
time. 
Reported, outcome 
unknown. 
Data too old to be useful for early detection of a 
bioterrorism attack. 
36 3/22/03 Gastroenteritis (4) Park B 3 Employees, 2 of these 
work in food services, 3 
are females, all seen at 
same clinic within the 
same park. 
Reported to directors, 
outcome unknown. 
 
37 3/22/03 Gastroenteritis (11) Com-
bined 
No major links. Reported, outcome 
unknown.  
 
38 3/25/03 Gastroenteritis (9) Com-
bined 
10 Reports, one double 
entry. 
Reported, outcome 
unknown. 
One double entry. 
39 4/4/03 Gastroenteritis (8) Park B 3 employees, 1 from UK, 
2 with same zip, cases 
reported from 2 clinics 
within same park. 
Reported, unknown 
outcome. 
 
40 4/12/03 Respiratory tract infection with 
fever (3) 
Park A No links. Reported, unknown 
outcome. 
This was a big increase for this particular park, 
probably due to the recent SARS scare, and the 
SARS informational meeting with providers. 
41 4/13/03 Encephalitis/meningitis (1) Park B Employee previously 
exposed to 
mononucleosis. 
Reported to directors, 
providers referred employee 
to healthcare facility.  
Symptoms reported here were similar to some 
symptoms reported with encephalitis, including 
headache, neck stiffness, fever, etc. 
Table 7. Alert and Warning Report: Test Period (Continued) 
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Combined Alerts & Warnings 
During the overall study period, there were 15 combined alerts/warnings, 11 of 
which were alerts and four were warnings. The most frequent syndromes that triggered 
combined alerts/warnings, were gastroenteritis (11), influenza-like illness (2), and 
respiratory tract infection with fever syndromes (2). The combined alerts included eight 
gastroenteritis and two influenza-like illnesses, with the combined warnings including 
three gastroenteritis, and one respiratory tract infection with fever. One combined alert of 
gastroenteritis occurred during the baseline study period and the other 14 during the test 
period.  
Facility Specific Alerts & Warnings 
The alerts issued to specific facilities during the baseline included four 
gastroenteritis alerts, two of which occurred at the military facility during November, and 
two at Theme Park A, one in June and one in August. There were three respiratory tract 
infections with fever alerts, all three reported at the military facility during the end of 
November 2002. The first respiratory alert at the military was among children, and the 
later respiratory alert was among mostly adults. There was one alert of rash with fever at 
Theme Park A during the month of July 2002, later confimed as a local outbreak of 
Fifth’s Disease. Of the four reports of rash with fever, all were children, three from South 
America and one from the United Kingdom.  
During the test period, there were four respiratory alerts and one warning. Three of 
the alerts and one warning occurred at the military facility during December and January, 
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and one at Park A during April 2003. Before the respiratory alert at Park A, a request for 
a training/education meeting was made to discuss the impact of SARS on surveillance. 
This alert could be attributed to better reporting of respiratory illnesses at Theme Park A.  
There were seven gastroenteritis alerts during the test period, including three 
occurred at Park B, two at Hospital X, one at Park A, and one at the military facility, all 
during December – April. Two influenza-like illness alerts were issued for the military, 
both in December 2002. The combined facility alerts for influenza-like illness occurred 
in late February and mid-March, 2003.  
The frequency of syndromes at Theme Park A and B was higher among employee 
departments that were considered “working areas” of the park where employees 
interacted with guests, compared to office/support positions in the back areas of the 
parks. 
Facility-Requested Serious Syndrome Alerts 
There were a total of 22 alerts, including 10 of the encephalitis/meningitis-like 
syndrome (six during baseline and four during the test period), five of the shock/sepsis 
syndrome (all during the test period), six rash with fever alerts (three during baseline and 
three during the test period), and three death with fever alerts, one of which contained 
three reports, but all were misreported. Four of the rash with fever alerts were issued to 
the military facility and two to the parks. Five of the encephalitis/meningitis-like 
syndrome alerts were issued to the military facility, three to Hospital X, and two to the 
parks. Three of the shock/sepsis alerts were issued to Hospital X, and two at the military 
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facility. There was one alert of botulism-like syndrome, but was a misreport by a 
provider at a theme park. 
Timeliness of Detection Among Clinics vs. Emergency Departments 
The combined alerts were issued for the respiratory tract infection syndrome, and the 
increase was seen at the clinics (military clinics B-E and all theme park clinics) five 
weeks before detected in the emergency departments (Hospital X and military emergency 
department), as can be seen in Figures 50-51. The more serious syndromes were more 
often reported at the emergency departments at the military facility and at Hospital X.  
Military and Theme Park Clinics Combined
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Figure 50. Weekly frequency of respiratory tract infection reports from all clinics 
combined. 
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Figure 51. Weekly frequency of respiratory tract infection reports from all emergency 
departments. 
Timeliness of Detection Among Youth vs. Adults 
Increases in respiratory tract infection reports were detected two weeks earlier in the 
less than 18 age group (week 25, in November) compared to the over 18 age group (week 
27, in November), as seen in Figure 52. Increases in the gastroenteritis reports were also 
detected two weeks earlier in the youth age group (week 25) compared to the adult group 
(week 27, in November), as shown in Figure 53. 
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Figure 52. Respiratory tract infection with fever reports by adult and youth age groups. 
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Figure 53. Gastroenteritis reports stratified by adult and youth age groups. 
Entry Count Alerts 
Entry count alerts were issued when the total number of entries increased above 
normal at any of the sites. There were a total of 13 alerts for significant increases and 
decreases of entry counts. Eight alerts were issued to sites for decreased entry counts, and 
five alerts were issued for increased entries. Table 8 shows the entry count alert report. 
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 Entry Count Alert Report for Overall Study Period 
Number Date Site Issue Action/Comment/Explanation 
1 8/6/02 Hospital X Entries were low. Reported to coordinator, and entries increased the 
next day. 
2 8/7/02 Park A Entries were low. Reported to coordinator and she stated that overall 
park attendance was low. 
3 9/12/02 Hospital X Entries were high. Backlogging data to catch up (data entry staff 
previously on vacation).  
4 10/10/02 Hospital X Entries were high. Backlogging data. Appointed a secondary data 
entry staff. 
5 11/18/02 Military Entries were low. Reported to coordinator. 
6 11/21/02 Park A Entries were low. Park attendance was down, and very few patients 
were seen. 
7 11/26/02 Military Entries were high. All clinics are better at reporting, more 
gastroenteritis and respiratory tract infections 
reported (2 alerts). 
8 12/2/02 Military Entries were high. Alert to military facility about frequent reports of 
respiratory tract infection with fever syndrome.  
9 12/23/02 Military Entries were low at a few clinics. Reported to site coordinator. 
10 1/13/03 Military Entries were low at a few clinics. Reported to site coordinator. 
11 1/14/03 Military Entries were low at a few clinics. Reported to site coordinator. 
12 1/28/03 Military Entries were high. Alert for military with frequent reports of 
respiratory tract infection with fever syndrome. 
13 3/17/03 Hospital X Entries were low. Patient volume was down. 
Table 8. Entry count alert/warning report. 
Low Entry Count Alerts 
Low entry count alerts were issued to help maintain compliance. Four low entry 
count alerts were issued to the military facility, two to Hospital X, and two to Theme 
Park A. The decreased entry count alerts at Theme Park A was due to overall low park 
attendance, and was confirmed by a park director. The military facility received several 
low entry alerts January 2003, due to deployments related to the war in Iraq.  
High Entry Count Alerts 
The high entry count alerts corresponded to syndromic alerts related to the 
respiratory tract infection with fever and gastroenteritis. It is not known whether the 
syndromic alerts can be attributed to the increased total entries on those dates, or whether 
more people presented to the facility. Hospital X reported backlogging data twice 
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because the data entry staff person was on vacation. As a result, other people were 
assigned to enter data in her absence.  
Reporting Errors 
There were six reporting errors, including five death with fever reports, all of which 
were misreported by healthcare providers. There was one report of botulism-like 
syndrome, also misreported by a healthcare provider at a theme park, who misunderstood 
the case definition of botulism. There was one misreport of the encephalitis/meningitis-
like syndrome reported from the military facility. Entering duplicate reports appeared to 
be more problematic than the misreports of syndromes. Although the system was built to 
recognize when duplicate records were reported, when the number/letter combination 
were reported in reverse order, the system was unable to determine when duplicates had 
been reported. This was more problematic at the military facility compared to the other 
sites because the patient identification letter/number combination was developed for the 
purposes of this study, and was collected routinely, which made it difficult for providers 
to remember the order in which the letters and numbers were placed.  
Outbreak Detection 
There were two significant outbreaks detected with the system. Significant increases 
in gastroenteritis reports were detected on October 30, 2002, and continued increasing 
through April 29, 2003, as shown in Figure 54. Influenza-like illness reports also 
increased significantly on November 11, 2002 and continued until March 20, 2003, as 
can be seen in Figure 55. Signficant increases in the respiratory tract infection syndrome 
 144 
were detected on November 7, 2002 and continued until March 11, 2003, as can be seen 
in Figure 56. A total of 10 individual reports of the encephalitis/meningitis-like syndome 
were detected, two of which were among children under the age of 15 years. Another 
encephalitis/meningitis alert was issued to a clinic and was later confirmed by a 
laboratory test as viral meningitis. There were five individual shock/sepsis reports 
identified from the emergency departments. A rash with fever outbreak was detected at 
Theme Park A, and was later identified as a local outbreak of Fifth’s Disease among 
children. Of the cases that were reported to this system, all but one were international 
guests, all children, and all but one report was from South America, and one from the 
United Kingdom.  
 
Figure 54. Gastroenteritis Reports from BioDefend™, May 29, 2002 – May 29, 2003. 
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Figure 55. Daily influenza-like illnesses reports from all sites. 
 
Figure 56. Daily respiratory tract infection with fever reports from all sites. 
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A gastroenteritis warning was issued to Theme Park B, and when the alert report was 
viewed, all were female, in their 40’s, living in the same zip code, and working in 
culinary services. During the baseline period in this study, reports of gastroenteritis at 
one park were detected, but were not significant. These reports could have been part of a 
national outbreak that originated at a Central Florida theme park that was not a part of 
this study. A salmonella outbreak of more than 300 persons was detected by the 
Minnesota Department of Health two months after it occurred. This particular park was 
hosting the transplant games, where persons that were recipients and organ donors and 
their families were in attendance, some of whom were immunocompromised. The 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention conducted a retrospective investigation by 
emailing participants that had an email address to determine if anyone in their household 
had become ill after attending the theme park event. Around 300 persons responded that 
at least one person in their household was sick. About half of these had been receiving 
immunosuppressive therapies and some were hospitalized. If this particular park had 
implemented this surveillance system, the outbreak might have been detected earlier and 
might have provided early intervention for those ill (62).  
Comparisons with State, Regional, and National Data 
State, regional, and national data were used to compare significant increases of the 
gastroenteritis, respiratory tract infection with fever, and influenza-like illness 
syndromes. Significant increases of gastroenteritis reports were detected in this study on 
October 28, 2002, and continued through April 2003, as can be seen in Figure 54. The 
increase was significant because it was detected more than one month before identified 
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by the Florida Department of Health’s statewide Norovirus surveillance of institutional 
settings (e.g. long term care facilities, assisted living facilities). State officials reported 
the increase in Norovirus-positive specimens during the end of November and the 
beginning of December (Figure 57). By the time the report was available, it was February 
2003, more than three months after it was identified using the BioDefend™ system (63).  
At the same time as the increases in gastroenteritis reports in Florida and those 
observed in this study, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reported an 
increase in Norovirus among several states, including Washington and New York. The 
Washington study reported an increase in November-December. New Hampshire 
reported 35 outbreaks of similar gastroenteritis-related illnesses identified from clinics 
that were consistent with norovirus infection. In New Hampshire, emergency department 
syndromic surveillance detected increases in gastroenteritis reports in December 2002. In 
New York City, a total of 66 outbreaks were detected in November 2002, and were 
consistent with norovirus infection. Personal communications with Epidemic Intelligence 
Service Officers from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention suggested that 
Norovirus activity was on the rise nationwide during this time of the increase in 
gastroenteritis reports detected in this study. The officials attributed this rise to an 
increase in community incidence of norovirus infection, as was suggested in New York 
City and New Hampshire. Also during this time, the Norovirus activity on cruise ships 
occurred in June – December 2002, with a flurry of activity in October. Two of the five 
outbreaks originated in Florida, and two included travel in Florida (64, 65). 
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Figure 57. Positive Norovirus Submissions Reported from Florida Department of Health 
 
 
 
Figure 58. Florida Department of Health Influenza-Like Illness Surveillance Data 
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Figure 59. South Atlantic Region Influenza-Like Illness Surveillance Data for 2002-2003 
 
Figure 60. National Summary of Influenza-Like Illness Surveillance Data for 2002-2003 
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Figure 61. National Summary of Influenza Isolates for 2002-2003 Influenza Isolates from 
the South Atlantic Region Reported by WHO/NREVSS Collaborating Laboratories 2002-
2003 Season 
 
Figure 62. South Atlantic Region Influenza Isolates for 2002-2003 
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As a result of the gastroenteritis increases, the surveillance sites were notified as 
well as public health officials at the county health departments, the state department of 
health, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s syndromic surveillance 
section and food borne surveillance sections.  
Influenza-like illness sentinel surveillance data were used as a comparison for the 
data captured with the BioDefend™ system. Increases in the Florida Department of 
Health’s influenza-like illness sentinel surveillance system detected increases during the 
first week of January, 2003, more than one month after significant increases were 
detected in this study, as shown in Figure 58 (66). Data for influenza-like illness was also 
available for the South Atlantic Region, which included the states of Florida, Tennessee, 
Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, and Maryland. The 
regional increases were detected during the last week of December 2002, again one 
month after detected in this study, as shown by Figure 59 (67). National influenza-like 
illness surveillance data reported by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention also 
revealed significant increases above normal during the last week of December 2002, as 
can be seen in Figure 60 (68). In addition, influenza laboratory data from the National 
Respiratory and Enteric Virus Surveillance System detected increases in positive 
influenza specimens in December 2002, as shown in Figure 61 (69). Influenza isolates 
from the same laboratory specific for the South Atlantic Region showed increases during 
January 2003, again more than one month after detected in this study, as shown in Figure 
62 (70). 
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Outbreak Response 
When an alert/warning was detected by the system, the first step was for the 
investigator to determine if the cases appeared to be epidemiologically linked, 
specifically by looking at the alert/warning report details that included the zip code, age, 
gender, employee/guest, travel history, country of origin, and date of illness. Alerts and 
warnings were issued via phone call or email to the site coordinators. If the event 
appeared serious, repeated phone calls were made until a site coordinator or a secondary 
or tertiary contact was reached. In addition, an email was sent with the patient 
identification number, syndromic and demographic information of the reports. If the 
event appeared to be real, the site coordinator usually reviewed the medical records and 
tried to confirm the syndromic report by initiating discussions with the provider that 
treated the patient(s). The appropriate actions were determined by the sites. The final 
decision regarding the alert was made based on the outcome information from the 
syndrome report, medical record, provider discussion, any lab confirmation tests, and/or 
discussions between the investigator and site coordinator. The primary site coordinators 
worked in administration, public health director positions, or had the authority to 
determine the appropriate actions taken.  
Health departments in the areas of the surveillance sites were notified of the study 
before implementation. To the best of our knowledge, there were no investigations 
conducted on the basis of alerts/warnings reported from this study by the health 
departments or the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The local health 
departments were contacted regarding the significant increases in the gastroenteritis and 
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influenza-like illness syndromes at all sites. This alert was also sent to the Epidemic 
Intelligence Service Officers in the syndromic surveillance and food borne outbreak 
branches of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 
The actions corresponding to alerts and warnings were divided into one of five 
categories; 1) site investigations, 2) health department investigations, 3) no investigation 
conducted, 4) false alarm, or 5) unknown. The surveillance sites were under no obligation 
to inform the investigator regarding the outcome of any investigation. If an investigation 
was conducted by either the site or health department, one of three events occurred; 1) 
nothing could be done about it, 2) an intervention was conducted, or 3) the event was not 
considered serious enough for an intervention.  
Interventions/PH Actions Resulting from Alerts 
At the military facility, the public health commander reported several interventions 
that resulted from being issued the alerts and warnings received from this study. Several 
informational bulletins were issued from the military public health units to all hospital 
and clinic staff about surveillance findings and recommendations. Significant alerts 
and/or findings were discussed in Medical Intelligence briefings to the hospital 
commander. In the individual clinics, time was set aside to discuss surveillance updates 
and related issues at staff meetings. Surveillance findings were shared with the Mobility 
Command Public Health Staff for dissemination to the entire national Command in their 
respective branch of service. The military findings from this study and the system will be 
presented at the national surveillance meeting for this particular branch of service in 
2003. All other surveillance sites followed up on alerts and/or warnings by reviewing 
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medical records, provider discussions, infection control and/or discussion in regularly 
scheduled meetings. Hospital X used laboratory data to help confirm alerts. As a result of 
the influenza-like illness and respiratory tract infection alerts, the military public health 
unit sent specific orders to all providers stating that the flu shot be given to all patients. 
This email was sent out on November 25, 2002, and one month later the number of cases 
dropped at this facility only. 
Outcome Evaluation at the Military Facility 
Due to the increased workload on the investigator, an assistant was hired to help with 
site communication, reviewing data, continual system improvement and integration, and 
evaluating site procedures. This assistant conducted evaluations at the military facility to 
assess reporting procedures. The evaluator was a new employee to the Center for 
Biological Defense at the University of South Florida, and was not known among the site 
staff at the time of the evaluation. The goal of having an unknown person conduct the 
evaluation was for the purpose of having a more objective observation of the overall 
reporting process, awareness, and knowledge of the surveillance study. The primary 
issues encountered by the evaluator were the lack of knowledge of the study and 
reporting procedures among the staff. Her recommendations for improving reporting 
were to install the digital bridge to automatically retrieve data from their electronic 
patient information system, for the purposes of ensuring compliance. She also 
recommended incorporation of a system introduction and syndromic training meeting at 
each clinic to ensure the staff had a good understanding and knowledge of expectations, 
and so they had all the resources to make accurate reporting possible.  
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DATA PARAMETERS 
Compliance 
Estimates of compliance were not obtained due to the difficulties sites had in 
reporting the daily number of visits in each clinic. Assessing the completeness of 
reporting was difficult due to the large variations in theme park attendance, which 
affected the number of visits to the first aid station/clinic and the referral hospital. Also, 
during this study, large numbers of military personnel were being deployed for war, 
which greatly affected compliance and the number of clinic visits.  
Hospital X had lower overall reporting during the baseline period. This was partly 
due to administrative changes, and the lack of awareness of the study among healthcare 
providers and support staff. Once new administration staff was assigned to the study, 
reporting increased significantly.  
For the theme parks, there were no clinic logs to show the number of persons seen 
per day that presented with an illness. Neither park could give estimates of the number of 
daily visits because they varied so much day-to-day by factors such as the weather, the 
economy, terrorist events from September 11, and other factors influencing theme park 
attendance. These factors also affected the referral hospital, Hospital X.  
The military hospital/clinics were not able to give estimates of the average number 
of daily visits per clinic. Several events might have influenced the compliance during this 
study, including the deployment of staff to war.  
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OUTBREAK DETECTION 
Flexibility 
An important requirement of the syndromic surveillance system selected for this 
study was the ability to continually modify the system for each site. Data collection 
forms, reporting procedures, and data parameters were customized for each site. This was 
imperative to the success of the study, and did not compromise the integrity or 
comparability of data between sites. Each surveillance site had unique needs and had 
specific requirements for integrating the system while keeping the burden on healthcare 
providers low.  
Two aspects of the system allowed for rapid changes to be made to meet the needs of 
the sites, first the system was written using Microsoft.NET development tools and 
architecture. The use of these tools, along with modern programming techniques, allowed 
BioDefend™ to be written in a highly modular fashion where changes could be made to 
one module without affecting the other modules. Secondly, the procedures at DataSphere 
allowed requested changes to be made in a timely manner. 
Timeliness 
The timeliness of reporting (when a patient presented with symptoms to the time of 
data entry) was assessed for syndromic data and was measured by the log of the time the 
records were reported from the sites, and compared to the date and time of patient visits. 
Timeliness was assessed for combined and individual sites, as shown in Table 3. Data 
were categorized into less than six hours of the patient visit, between six and 12 hours, 
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12-24 hours, or over 24 hours. Table 9 shows the timeliness of reporting for the 
combined and individual site data. The facility with the most reports in the less than six-
hour category was Park A. Park A also reported less patient visits overall compared to the 
other sites, perhaps allowing more time for data reporting. The military facility had the 
second highest percentage of reports entered in less than six hours. It also appeared that 
smaller clinics that provided cared for fewer patients also reported data more timely 
compared to the emergency departments.  
Of all syndromic data, 67.4% were reported more than 24 hours after the patient 
visit. During the baseline period, 18.6% of the data were reported within six hours of the 
patient visit, but declined to 9.1% during the test period. This decline in the timeliness of 
reporting could be a factor of increased reporting. At Hospital X, 93.6% of the data 
during the baseline and 78.1% during the test period were reported in excess of 24 hours 
following the patient visit. Although this suggests a slight improvement in the timeliness 
of reporting, automated data collection may be required in order to receive more timely 
data. 
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 All Sites 
 Baseline Pd. (%) Test Pd. (%)  
< 6hrs 129 (18.6) 145 (9.1) 274 (11.9) 
6-12 hrs 45 (6.5) 95 (5.9) 140 (6.1) 
12-24 hrs 66 (9.5) 268 (16.7) 334 (14.5) 
> 24 hrs 453 (65.4) 1095 (68.3) 1548 (67.4) 
Total 693 1603 2296 
    
 Military Facility 
 Baseline Pd. (%) Test Pd. (%)  
< 6hrs 105 (21.4) 106 (12.5) 211 (15.7) 
6-12 hrs 26 (5.3) 52 (6.1) 78 (5.8) 
12-24 hrs 45 (9.2) 157 (18.5) 202 (15.1) 
> 24 hrs 314 (64.1) 536 (63.0) 850 (63.4) 
Total 490 851 1341 
    
 Hospital X 
 Baseline Pd. (%) Test Pd. (%)  
< 6hrs 0 (0) 16 (2.6) 16 (2.4) 
6-12 hrs 0 (0) 31(4.9) 31 (4.6) 
12-24 hrs 3 (6.3) 90 (14.4) 93 (13.8) 
> 24 hrs 44 (93.6) 489 (78.1) 533 (79.2) 
Total 47 626 673 
    
 Theme Park B 
 Baseline Pd. (%) Test Pd. (%)  
< 6hrs 4 (4.9) 10 (11.8) 14 (8.4) 
6-12 hrs 1(1.2) 4 (4.7) 5 (3.0) 
12-24 hrs 15 (18.3) 17 (20) 32 (19.2) 
> 24 hrs 62 (75.6) 54 (63.5) 116 (69.5) 
Total 82 85 167 
    
 Theme Park A 
 Baseline Pd. (%) Test Pd. (%)  
< 6hrs 20 (31.3) 13 (31.7) 33 (31.4) 
6-12 hrs 8 (12.5) 8 (19.5) 16 (15.2) 
12-24 hrs 3 (4.7) 4 (9.8) 7 (6.7) 
> 24 hrs 33 (51.6) 16 (39.0) 49 (46.7) 
Total 64 41 105 
    
Table 9. Timeliness of Reporting Syndromic Data  
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DATA QUALITY 
International Data 
The country of origin was assessed for park visitors, as shown in the country listing 
in Table 10. Most persons were from the United States, and the most frequently reported 
countries of origin from the theme parks were the United Kingdom, Canada, and 
Columbia. Also, not shown in this analysis was the recent travel history (the past 30 
days) for patients that presented with a syndrome at the military facility. 
Completeness of Data 
The most frequently missing data elements were the last four digits of the social 
security number, illness dates, zip codes, and birth dates. All other demographic 
information was required, and the system would not allow records to be submitted until 
these fields were complete.  
EXPERIENCE 
Usefulness 
Perhaps one of the most important aspects of this study is a demonstration that the 
use of technology and automated analysis for the detection of outbreaks in near, real-time 
for public health surveillance is possible. The usefulness could perhaps be seen in the 
following scenario, as a patient enters the clinic with smallpox-like symptoms, the data is 
entered automatically while the patient is still in the clinic. With the ability to detect one 
severe illness in near, real-time, the patient could be quarantined until lab confirmation 
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was completed, thus reducing community exposures and transmission and perhaps 
halting the introduction of the agent to the population at-risk. The system was useful for 
the military hospital/clinics as noted by the public health commander, reporting that this 
study helped bridge communications between the medical clinics and public health unit. 
The theme parks also reported that the system was useful, especially by having access to 
employee illnesses. They also reported that during the SARS outbreak, the system 
provided staff with more security and assurance of detecting a potential bioterrorism 
event early.  
Acceptability 
The surveillance system was accepted by all of the participating surveillance sites. 
Resistance was encountered from a few physicians at the military hospital, often 
physicians with little or no public health training or understanding of the usefulness of 
surveillance. Over time, as alerts were reported, trainings were held, acceptability among 
all sites continued to increase.  
Generalizability 
Although the results from this study do not apply to other geographical locations, the 
system itself could be replicated elsewhere. The BioDefend™ system could be used in a 
variety of settings using the same or similar methodologies described in this study.  
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Stability 
There were three system outages during the study period, but were repaired within a 
few hours once programmers were notified of the error(s). The cause for the outages were 
due to faulty upgrade procedures on the software. No data were ever lost.  
Simplicity 
The data forms were easy to complete, especially for “no syndromes.” The forms and 
reporting procedures were customized for each site so that they would better integrate 
into routine practices at each site. The reporting procedures were also simple (62). 
Cost 
The cost of implementing this surveillance system using the BioDefend™ software 
developed by DataSphere in five military clinics, two theme parks, and one hospital was 
$27,400 (See Table 10). A breakdown of this total includes a one-time setup price of 
$13,000 plus the monthly fee of $1,200 per month for 12 months (totaling $14,400 per 
year) for a total of $27,400 for the entire study. The cost of an additional year would be 
$14,400. The initial set-up fee was $1,000 per facility and $200 per site (each site refers 
here to each specific clinic/first aid station within each facility). The reporting tool, or 
data analysis software was installed for the investigator and for sites interested in viewing 
their own data. The cost of the reporting tool varied depending on whether it was for the 
investigator (for viewing all data) or for a specific facility (to view site-specific data). 
The cost of the reporting tool for the investigator was $1,000 per user with a minimum 
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five users. The cost of the reporting tool for each facility was $1,000 with a minimum of 
two users.  
 
 
    
 These quotes are valid during study period and are subject to change thereafter. 
 Quantity     
BioDefend™ Cost Facilities Sites Total Setup fee   
Digital Bridge 0 0  $5,000.00  per Facility  
Initial Setup Services 4 10 6,000 $1,000.00  per Facility and $200 per site 
Reporting for Investigator 1 0 5,000 $1,000.00  per user, minimum 5 users 
Reporting for Facility 2 0 2,000 $1,000.00  per user, minimum 2 users 
       
 One-Time Setup Total $13,000      
       
       
 Quantity Total  Monthly Fees   
Digital Bridge 0 $0.00    $ 500.00  per site  
Web entry form 4 $200.00    $ 50.00  per site  
Reporting for Investigator 1 $500.00    $ 500.00  per reporting site  
Reporting for Facility 2 $500.00    $ 250.00  per reporting site  
       
 Total Monthly Fee $14,400      
       
       
 Overall Cost $27,400    For each additional study year $14,400.00  
       
Table 10. BioDefend™ Study Cost 
Communication 
There was much communication between surveillance sites and the investigator 
during this study. Weekly discussions at most sites during the first few months of 
implementation aided in system customization, requirements, planning of training 
meetings, and to troubleshoot any issues related to surveillance. A phone number was 
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provided to all the sites in the event that there was a problem with the system or 
questions about study procedures or syndromes during anytime during the study period. 
This phone number was linked to a pocket PC phone maintained by the investigator to 
receive and report automated alerts and warnings in near real-time, and to view data. The 
pocket PC phone is shown in Figure 57, and is a hand-held phone and mini computer 
with wireless access to the Internet. Data could be viewed by accessing the system 
website and logging onto the reporting tool. Alerts were received in text messaging 
format with the syndrome, syndrome frequency, patient identification number, facility, 
clinic name, and contact numbers at the site(s). 
 
Figure 63. Pocket PC phone 
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LIMITATIONS OF FORMAL HYPOTHESIS TESTING FOR SURVEILLANCE DATA 
There are limitations of using surveillance data for hypothesis testing, such as the 
absence of cases and controls, and the lack of a controlled environment. However, the 
usefulness of this system in the early detection of an epidemic and/or biological attack is 
likely to outweigh the cost for response. 
Research Question 1 
Can a syndromic surveillance system identify communicable diseases of public 
health importance before routine surveillance methods? 
Hypothesis 
Incorporating near real-time reporting techniques with automated analysis and 
notification would reduce the detection time by hours, days, or weeks. 
It is somewhat difficult to compare syndromic data to specific illness data due to the 
nonspecific nature of the syndromes. Detecting communicable diseases earlier with 
syndromic surveillance systems compared to with routine surveillance has been shown in 
this study with the early detection of the gastroenteritis and influenza-like illness 
syndromes more than one month before data from other state, regional, and national 
surveillance systems. The integration of state-of-the-art technology can enable the early 
detection of a bioterrorism attack or infection disease outbreak compared to traditional 
surveillance methodologies. 
The best example of detecting a significant community-wide increase of a 
communicable disease in this study can be seen with the significant increase of 
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gastroenteritis reports on October 30, 2002, compared to state data that reported on 
February 13, 2003 that increases of positive Norovirus specimens were detected during 
the end of November, as shown in Figure 54 and 57. By the time the data were reported 
by the state, they were already old, and preventing further exposure was a greater 
challenge than if the outbreaks had been detected earlier. Although syndromic 
surveillance for the purposes of bioterrorism is a relatively new public health discipline, 
the potential for using syndromes as early indicators of community outbreaks, combined 
with of state-of-the-art technology can rapidly decrease the time of detecting infectious 
diseases epidemics, whether spread naturally or intentionally by way of a bioterrorism 
attack (63). 
By comparing the influenza-like illness data from state, regional, and national 
surveillance and laboratory data, the same early detection pattern with the BioDefend™ 
system was identified more than one month before detected in any of the other systems 
compared. On November 11, 2002, significant increases in influenza-like illness reports 
were detected in this study. The Florida Department of Health data detected increases in 
influenza-like illness reports (from institutional settings) during the first week of January 
2003, almost two months after detected by the BioDefend™ system. The South Atlantic 
Region and national data did not detect the increases in their influenza-like illness data 
until the last week of December 2002, which was more than one month later than this 
study (66-70). 
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Research Question 2 
Is syndromic surveillance a reasonable approach for bioterrorism preparedness and 
should it be incorporated into the public health infrastructure even if the threat of 
bioterrorism disappears? 
Hypothesis 
Syndromic surveillance may identify illnesses of public health importance early 
enough to reduce or prevent disease and death, which could make it worthy of 
incorporating into the public health and medical infrastructure. 
Considering the federal dollars that have been spent on bioterrorism preparedness 
over the past two years, and how there is still much more information needed to identify 
the best methods and locations of early exposures, the best use of existing bioterrorism 
funds would be for early detection. Since it is not likely that we can prevent terrorist 
groups from making, storing, and/or using weapons of mass destruction, preventing a 
bioterrorism event is not practical, at least from the public health point of view. However, 
the best mechanism of prevention and preparedness is identification of the attack with 
near real-time reporting and notification of illnesses. In order to do this, we must have a 
good, accurate, and timely estimates of the normal frequency of infectious diseases 
occurring in the population of interest at any given time. In addition, real-time 
surveillance methods can only strengthen and improve existing surveillance of infectious 
diseases. The cost of implementing the BioDefend™ system is not high, especially given 
the cost of responding to an attack and/or epidemic. The BioDefend™ syndromic 
surveillance system used in this study can be implemented in most any setting in the 
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United States. It should also be noted that not only has this system been easily 
implemented, but the design is simple, flexible, and has also been accepted by the 
institutions currently using it.  
We do not yet know the effect of having real-time frequencies of infectious diseases 
present in a population, but this knowledge should serve to prevent more illness and 
death from community outbreaks and a bioterrorism attack. By establishing normal 
thresholds of certain illnesses in a population, one can quickly know through the use of 
automated analysis when illnesses within that population increase above normal. 
Syndromic surveillance is a simple concept and can be readily implemented in most any 
healthcare facility. It is easy to implement and costs much less than responding to and 
treating 100,000 people exposed to anthrax or the plague. We know that the potential 
economic impact of a bioterrorism attack is extremely high, and would drain a vast 
majority of community, state, and federal resources, both human and financial. The cost 
of exposing 100,000 people to Bacillus anthracis is about $26 billion, and if another 
100,000 people were exposed to Brucella melitensis, the estimated cost burden is 
approximately $478 million (5).  
Based on these costs, authors from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
have previously recommended rapid implementation of post attack prophylaxis programs 
as the most important means of reducing the human losses (11). Preventing transmissions 
and reducing exposures through early detection can better minimize human and financial 
losses compared to relying on after-attack treatments.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND  
IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE 
Public health professionals with access to information on the health and environmental 
effects of war or militarism, and on factors that may cause war, have the capability – and 
we believe, the responsibility – to gather these data, to analyze them, and to make them 
widely available. Such data can be extremely useful, if used by health professionals and 
others in education and awareness-raising programs, in preventing war or preparation 
for war, or in causing a halt to a war that is taking place. 
—Levy and Victor Sidel 
SUMMARY  
The most important findings in this study were the early detection of the 
gastroenteritis and influenza-like illness events detected more than one month before they 
were identified by routine state, regional, and national surveillance. Although the 
findings were unexpected, it is not suprising that by incorporating state-of-the-art 
technology that provides automated analysis and notification capabilities with public 
health surveillance can greatly decrease the detection time of infectious disease 
outbreaks. The goal of decreasing routine detection of outbreak by hours, days, or weeks 
was exceeded in this study. Not only were large community-wide outbreaks detected 
early, but also individual cases of serious illnesses of public health importance. The 
frequency of alerts and warnings in this study might have been more sensitive than ideal, 
however, due to the high-risk nature of the facilities, it was appropriate considering the 
timing of implementation. Other studies including the Boston Public Health Commission 
system issued 103 alerts during the year 2002, and 22 entry count alerts (35). They 
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system used in for 30 days in New York City after the terrorist attacks resulted in 91 
alerts of five syndromes (68,546 total entries). This effort in New York showed parallel 
results to the findings in this study regarding the most frequently reported syndromes 
were respiratory and gastroenteritis (4). The Boston study did not report the total number 
of entries. 
The importance of evaluating different syndromic surveillance systems is imperative 
in order to rapidly detect naturally-occurring and/or intentional outbreaks. Some of the 
system claimed to be real-time and automated when in fact, they were not. Many large 
and well-funded systems base real-time syndromic surveillance on using diagnosis data 
that takes days to weeks to be coded. Syndromic surveillance is not inclusive of 
diagnosis-related data, by definition, it is the early capture of data before a diagnosis is 
made. By using old data, the near real-time capabilities are not possible, yet many 
systems using these methodologies claim otherwise. Before money is spent using these 
systems, evaluations of outcome data and system effectiveness for real-time outbreak 
detection should be published. There also appeared to be a lack of overall flexibility of 
systems to be used in a variety of settings, and a lack of knowledge that baseline data is 
required for establishing accurate thresholds for reporting events. If systems are 
implemented that do not carefully consider these factors, it could lead to the medical and 
public health infrastructure overburdened with reporting and responding to false alarms.  
The features of the BioDefend™ system, including customizability and the overall 
flexibility of the system, were a determining factor for facilities to participate. There 
were differences in every clinic involved in this study, and the system was customized at 
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every site. It was also necessary to provide training and feedback to the site staff to 
maintain reporting, and for general bioterrorism awareness and knowledge. This study 
also shows the importance of syndromic surveillance being a local issue, because the 
knowledge needed for successful implementation is lies within the local level. Although 
these systems can be implemented on a local level, it is still important that systems can 
be linked to state and federal surveillance systems. 
During the study, several events occurred that could have affected the reporting of 
the system, such as SARS, West Nile Virus, influenza, and the War on Terrorism. These 
events prompted the addition of a new syndrome, thus showing the need for a system that 
can continually be updated as new health risks occur. BioDefend™ was developed 
because there was no single bioterrorism syndromic surveillance system available that 
met the requirements for this study and the sites.  
This surveillance system had some early successes with detecting a local outbreak of 
Fifth’s Disease among children mostly from South America at a theme park, and 
individual more serious illnesses, such as 10 reports of the encephalitis/meningitis-like 
syndromes, one of which was a confirmed case of viral meningitis, and two were among 
children less that 15 years of age, and five reports of the shock/sepsis syndrome. The 
increase in upper and lower respiratory tract infection, febrile illness, and influenza-like 
illness served as a potential indicator of flu season. All these syndromes are important 
considering Florida’s recent history with the anthrax attacks of 2001, the cruise ship 
Norovirus epidemic, and West Nile Virus. Not only were these early successes important 
for the region, but also for state and federal institutions to know that routine surveillance 
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can be improved with the use of appropriate technology. The timing of the study also 
provided the surveillance sites with an added assurance of protection knowing that 
syndromic reports were being monitored on a larger scale during the War on Terrorism.  
STRENGTHS 
The automated analysis component of the system that enabled automated alerts and 
warnings worked well for reporting increases in near real-time to facilities. The 
combined alerts were important in detecting community-wide phenomena, which could 
indicate regional epidemics. Capturing the more serious syndromes at the time when 
patients first presents to healthcare facilities can provide more time to effectively 
treatment some illnesses, and provide immediate quarantine and isolation for highly 
infectious agents. This should prevent further exposure, illness, and death. The 
BioDefend™ system has proven to be useful and that it can be sustained in these settings. 
Other system have shown that they can be implemented, but are not sustainable. The 
reporting increased throughout the study and timely feedback of data were provided to 
local, state, and federal public health officials. 
The surveillance sites were chosen based on their high-risk of being a target of 
bioterrorism, and also because some of them served an international population. 
Capturing the country of origin of the patients that presented with a syndrome and the 
recent travel history of military personnel provided important epidemiological links. 
The early successes of this study have already had at least one impact on other 
syndromic surveillance system, such as eliminating demographic data for nonsyndromic 
reports. Recent similar system development efforts have aimed to replicate this system, 
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but have not been successful at automating analysis, notification, and providing the 
necessary security.  
It was determined that the frequency of reported syndromes was highest among both 
park departments that were considered in the working areas or areas that employees 
interacted with guests, as opposed to office or support positions in the back areas of the 
parks. The theme parks were interested in determining whether or not there was a pattern 
among employee versus guest syndrome reports. Some believe that ill guests enter the 
parks, and a few weeks later, similar illnesses are seen among the employees. By 
assessing whether or not the patient was an employee or guest, and the department in 
which employees worked, this could be determined, and also could be early indicators of 
events that originate in specific departments.  
Throughout the study, many requests from the site staff were made about SARS, the 
potential impact of this illness on their organizations, and requests for additional 
infectious disease and bioterrorism training. The feedback and training meetings were 
extremely important to discuss current issues and to troubleshoot any issues so that 
reporting would increase and be maintained. The site meetings were also a time to 
discuss community health risks and public health education. Some of the sites agreed to 
share their data in the best interest of the community, as long as there was assurance that 
the confidentiality of their patients and facility would be preserved. During the study, the 
system received ample press attention, and was recommended for “Best Practices” 
among one of the military branches and one hospital received positive feedback from 
Joint Commission, an accreditation organization for hospitals. 
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WEAKNESSES 
The data were probably not representative of the Central Florida area, due to the 
special population implementation of the system, but it was not the intended to be 
representative. Although six months of baseline data were collected, one full year would 
have provided a more complete seasonal pattern of syndromes since illness can vary by 
geographical location and time of year.  
Additional limitations include specific biases for similar surveillance studies, 
including medical surveillance (or detection), misclassification, selection, and 
aggregation biases. An example of a medical surveillance or detection bias in this study 
was the potential impact of the SARS epidemic, and because it was given close media 
attention from February to the present, providers may have more closely monitored 
patients with the respiratory syndrome, or might have misclassified syndromes because 
of the increased awareness of this particular syndrome, showing the possibilities of a 
misclassification bias (71, 72). A selection bias was possible because persons that visit a 
theme park could have differences from those that do not visit, and one might expect 
similar biases with the theme park referral hospital, and with the military facility. An 
aggregation bias could have occurred when data were combined, which might have 
indicated an association of two factors, but was not true for individuals. An example of 
this phenomena would be the rise in shock/sepsis among children at the pediatric clinic at 
the military facility. When the data from all sites was aggregated, it appeared that the 
increase in shock/sepsis occurred system-wide, but was only a factor of a pediatric clinic 
at one site that was reported all the cases (10). In this study, the aggregation bias was 
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limited due to the ability to view data by each site and by clinic. There are limitations 
with surveillance data, mostly because they are observational by nature, as opposed to 
designed studies such as a randomized controlled trial, in which it might be easier to 
measure outcome data with more assurance of associations (51).  
The inability to measure compliance, accuracy of the data, sensitivity of alerts, and 
the lack of some data being reporting timely were all limitations affecting reliability in 
this study. The parameters for reporting alerts was possibly set too low, making the 
alerting system too sensitive. Part of the high sensitivity was due to possible lack of 
trends established during the six-month period of baseline data collection. One year or 
more baseline data could have improved the thresholds for reporting alerts. The 
parameters and thresholds established for reporting alerts were based not only on 
historical trends, but also by the seriousness of the syndrome. Although, due to the time 
period of the study implementation (post-September 11 and the War on Terrorism), the 
alerting system should have been more sensitive, and therefore was not a serious 
limitation.  
FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
The BioDefend™ system in the future will include the implementation of a digital 
bridge designed to automatically collect syndromic and demographic data from patient 
information systems, virtually eliminating issues of compliance, data entry, accuracy, and 
timeliness of reporting. This process will be implemented as follows: the provider views 
each medical record from a computer while the patient is in the room. A checkbox 
embedded in the patient record will require the provider to select a syndromic or non-
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syndromic option by clicking on the appropriate box. The system will automatically 
retrieve the demographic information from the patient record and be reported in near 
real-time. This syndromic checkbox will be a mandatory field for the physician to 
complete before exiting the patient record. The difficulties with implementing the digital 
bridge is that it has been estimated that currently, only 5% of hospitals have completely 
automated medical records (1). The military facility will continue using the BioDefend™ 
system and will be the first site to implement the digital bridge and automated system. 
The integration of Emergency Medical Systems (EMS) that have electronic medical 
record systems into the study is also planned.  
 
More statistical testing, mathematical modeling, and the identification of a gold 
standard to serve as, and to provide a a comparison for various systems will help validate 
systems and gain support from policy makers for the integration of syndromic 
surveillance into high-risk facilities. Methods for measuring the reliability of providers 
classifying patients according to syndromes is planned to help validate the system. The 
thresholds for reporting alerts worked well in this study, but in the future these will be 
updated based on validation studies. Measurements to determine how many alerts were 
true alerts will be included in validation studies. 
The integration of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) is planned for the next 
year, and will aid in data visualization, and serve as a useful tool to gain support from 
directors, policy makers, community members, and many others by showing maps of 
syndromic clusters of outbreaks detected with syndromic surveillance (73). Plans are 
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being made to ensure the system is compliant with state and federal surveillance systems, 
including the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS), and the state 
MERLIN surveillance system.  
A future study is planned to look at employee and guest illnesses at the theme parks. 
It is possible that an epidemic could be masked by analyzing employees and guests 
together. By stratifying the data by employee and guest, might eliminate the chance of 
diluting an event. In addition, if a bioterrorism event occurred at another park, in another 
country, and/or at the airport, the system should be able to detect the event earlier among 
guests, before illnesses were transmitted to employees. The parks appear to be prime 
locations for potential early detection sites of infectious diseases/bioterrorism events due 
to not only their high-risk, but the concentrated area of international guests with diverse 
exposures, and various types of animals. Since fewer patients visit the theme park clinics, 
and often present with less severe symptoms than an emergency department, the theme 
parks could be settings in which an outbreaks could be identified more rapidly. However, 
the theme parks are not likely to have electronic medical records. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study showed that the purpose of detecting an outbreak within hours, days, or 
weeks before routine surveillance was exceeded. Throughout the study, participation 
increased, where other systems have failed. The success of this system could be 
attributed to several factors, including the increased perceived risk of bioterrorism, the 
flexibility of the system, training, and feedback to participating staff. By incorporating 
state-of-the-art technology with surveillance studies, fewer investigators are needed 
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because personal digital technology can provide a means for receiving notifications and 
reviewing data, offering more flexibility for investigators to spend time and money for 
training, investigation, and response. Training should be a necessary component to all 
syndromic surveillance systems for healthcare providers know how to identify biological 
agent exposures, and to be able to report them to their local health department (74). A 
training program that allows providers to collect continuing medical education credit 
should enhance participation. 
There is also a need for more peer-reviewed literature and comparative evaluations 
on syndromic surveillance systems nationwide. Instead of allocating money for large 
federal surveillance efforts, money would be better placed in local areas of increased risk 
of bioterrorism attacks, and on systems that have shown effective evaluations. 
Congressman John Dingell reported that sick persons visit clinics and emergency 
departments, and not federal agencies or government contractors, and physicians receive 
help from local health departments, and this is where emphasis should be placed. Before 
having all-inclusive systems that collect multiple data sources, early successes with 
single data sources should be documented and published with detailed information on 
data sources, methods of analysis, and detection of real outbreaks. Congressman Dingel 
also warned against developing, “high-powered surveillance systems that provide daily 
reams of information that cannot be analyzed, are not useful, and wear people out. They 
will likely cost much and accomplish little,” (75).  
High-risk facilities, such as theme parks, referral hospitals, and potential military 
targets should continue syndromic surveillance efforts. It would be useful to expand 
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surveillance to theme park referral clinics. If possible, syndromes are likely best collected 
automatically to eliminate reporting, timeliness, and accuracy burdens. It has been 
estimated that only about 5% of healthcare facilities have patient information systems 
(1). Current increased money allocated for bioterrorism should be used to assist high-risk 
facilities in implementing near real-time and automated syndromic surveillance systems 
like the one used in this study. The lack of facilities having patient information systems is 
not a valid reason to neglect syndromic surveillance responsibilities, but incorporating 
flexible systems can enable surveillance to be conducted with minimal burden to 
providers. A congressional act should be developed to mandate high-risk and military 
facilities in the United States and overseas to conduct near real-time syndromic 
surveillance for the detection of bioterrorism and infectious diseases. This is not likely to 
occur until there is a high-impact bioterrorism attack in the United States. Syndromic 
surveillance methodologies from this study can be used improve the timeliness of 
traditional surveillance of infectious diseases. Multiple data sources should be 
incorporated to confirm alerts and provide rapid epidemiological links, and to increase 
the sensitivity of alerts and warnings. Before combining various data sources, systems 
should be carefully evaluated for effectiveness and outcomes published. These systems 
should provide more that mere data collection. Only systems that incorporate automated 
analysis and alerting methodologies will be capable of identifying outbreaks in near real-
time and be sustainable. From experiences in this study, the optimal syndromic 
surveillance effort would be to implement the system in settings with patient information 
systems with a system that is flexible and customizable to changing health risks of the 
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population served. In additon, incorporating automated analysis and alert capabilities 
with visualiztion tools, such as Geographic Information Systems, should be a requirement 
in order to enable rapid detection. Systems must also be able to communicate with state, 
regional, and national public health surveillance systems so that response and actions will 
follow. Mere reporting is not surveillance, and in order for actions to follow findings, 
surveillance must be more than a storehouse for data (27).  
IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH, BIOTERRORISM,  
AND INFECTIOUS DISEASE SURVEILLANCE 
Implementation of syndromic surveillance among high-risk facilities can offer more 
rapid identification of infectious diseases and potential bioterrorism attacks earlier than 
would be detected with routine surveillance. These systems are not designed to replace 
existing notifiable disease reporting procedures, but if given the opportunity, could 
improve the timliness and quality in which the data are reported. It has been estimated 
that the compliance of mandatory reporting of diseases from physicians is less than 20%, 
thus showing the need for improving the need for improved reporting or methods to make 
reporting easier (1). With the ever-increasing threat of bioterrorism, high-risk facilities 
must be prepared for rapid detection so that exposures and death will be minimal, and 
fewer healthcare resources will be exhausted on response. The early detection of 
bioterrorism events is imperative for the prevention of unecessary exposure and 
transmission, but surveillance systems need to be more timely and sensitive (76). 
Prevention through careful planning is key for identifying index or early cases of 
infectious diseases. Early successes of syndromic surveillance systems should be 
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measured by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s paper on evaluating 
syndromic surveillance systems for the detection of bioterrorism, and findings published 
in peer-reviewed literature. Syndromic data should follow a similar “gold standard,” and 
should be able to communicate with state and federal systems when necessary, without 
compromising patient or site confidentiality.  
Syndromic surveillance should not be implemented at all healthcare facilities in the 
United States, but can be useful and provide added protection among sites that are 
potential targets of terrorist attacks during periods of high-risk. With increased spending 
for bioterrorism preparedness, syndromic surveillance can enhance existing infectious 
disease surveillance programs to foster a more rapid disease reporting system that will 
enable the early detection of epidemics and bioterrorism attacks, thus benefiting not only 
the public health system, but the global population. Perhaps it is best said by the former 
Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Dr. Jeffery Koplan, “Either 
we are all protected or we are all at risk,” (77).
 181 
REFERENCES 
1. Scalet SD. Immune Systems. Chief Information Officer. June 1, 2003 issue. Accessed 
June 6, 2003. 
2. CDC Guidelines Working Group. Updated Guidelines for Evaluating Public Health 
Surveillance Systems. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2001;50(RR13):1-35. 
3. Sosin, D. Draft Framework for Evaluating Syndromic Surveillance Systems for 
Bioterrorism Preparedness. Available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/epo/dphsi/phs/syndromic.htm. Accessed February 15, 2003. 
4. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Syndromic Surveillance for Bioterrorism 
following the attacks on the World Trade Center—New York City, 2001. MMRW 
Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2002;51:13-15. 
5. McCook A. Airborne Anthrax in US Could Cost 123,400 Lives. Medscape Available 
at http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/450972_print. Accessed March 27, 2003. 
6. Okie S. Tensions Between CDC, White House; Health Officials Say Low Morale 
Could Threaten Agency’s Ability to Handle Crises. July 1, 2002. Available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A5672-2002Jun30.html. Accessed 
July 5, 2003. 
7. Ault A. US Still Unprepared for New Infectious Disease Threats. Medscape. March 
18, 2003. Available at http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/450986_print. 
Accessed March 27, 2003. 
8. Moser R, White GL, Lewis-Younger CR, Garrett LC. Preparing for expected 
bioterrorism attacks. Military Medicine 2001;166(5):369-374. 
9. Hamburg M. Microbial Threats to Health. The National Academies. March 18, 2003. 
Available at http://www4.nas.edu/news.nsf/isbn/s030908864X?OpenDocument. 
Accessed June 17, 2003. 
10. Last JM, ed. A Dictionary of Epidemiology. 4th ed. New York: Oxford Press. 2001. 
11. Center for the Study of Bioterrorism & Emerging Infections. Biological Terrorism 
Introduction. August 20, 2001. St. Louis University School of Public Health. 
Available at http://bioterrorism.slu.edu/quick/pps/BT_general.pdf. Accessed January 
5, 2003. 
12. Eitzen EM, Takafuji ET. Historical Overview of Biological Warfare. In: Medical 
Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare. Office of the Surgeon General at TMM 
Publications 2001:415-424. 
13. Alibek K, Handelman S. Biohazard. New York: Random House. 1999. 
 182 
14. Guillemin J. Anthrax: The Investigation of a Deadly Outbreak. Berkeley & Los 
Angeles, CA: University of California Press, Ltd. 1999. 
15. Ohbu S, et al. Sarin Poisoning on Tokyo Subway. Southern Medical Association On-
line. June 3, 1997. Available at http://www.sma.org/smj/97june3.htm. Accessed 
March 15, 2003. 
16. Center for Counterproliferation Research. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 
Nuclear Terrorism: The Threat According to the Current Unclassified Literature; 
Executive Summary. National Defense University, 2002. 
17. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Update: Investigation of Bioterrorism-
Related Anthrax and Adverse Events from Antimicrobial Prophylaxis. MMWR Morb 
Mortal Wkly Rep 2001;50(44):973-6. 
18. US Army Medical Research Institute. Medical Management of Biological Casualties 
Course. Frederick, MD: US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Disease. 
2002. 
19. Levy BS, Sidel VW. War and Public Health. New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press. 1997.  
20. O’Toole T. Biological Weapons: National Security Threat and Public Health 
Emergency. Speech & Lecture, August 22, 2000. Center for Strategic and 
International Studies. Available at http://www.hopkins-
biodefense.org/pages/events/csis.html. Accessed March 29, 2001. 
21. Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Chemical and biological weapons: Possession 
and Programs Past and Present. Monterey Institute of International Studies. Available 
at http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/possess.htm. Accessed February 11, 2002. 
22. Kaufmann AF, Meltzer MI, Schmid GP. The economic impact of a bioterrorist attack: 
are prevention and postattack intervention programs justifiable? Atlanta-Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention. Emerging Infectious Diseases 1997;3(2). 
23. Haselkorn A. Iraq’s Bio-Warfare Option: Last Resort, Preemption, or a Blackmail 
Weapon? Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: BioDefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 
2002;1(1). 
24. The White House. Executive Order 13228; October 8, 2001. Federation of American 
Scientists. Available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-13228.htm. Accessed 
January 14, 2002. 
25. Congressional Budget Office. H.R. 5005, Homeland Security Act of 2002: As 
introduced on June 24, 2002. Available at http://www.cbo.gov. Accessed March 13, 
2003. 
26. Ashraf H. Europe’s response to bioterrorism starts slowly but gathers pace. The 
Lancet 2002;360(9335):733-4. 
27. Halperin W, Baker EL. Public Health Surveillance. New York, NY: John Wiley & 
Sons, Inc. 1992. 
 183 
28. US Army Medical Research Institute. Medical Management of Biological Casualties 
Handbook. Fort Detrick, MD: US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious 
Disease. 2001. 
29. McDade JE. Addressing the Potential Threat of Bioterrorism-Value Added to an 
Improved Public Health Infrastructure. Atlanta-Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention. Emerging Infectious Diseases 2000;5(4). 
30. Mandl KD. Syndromic Surveillance: Temporal Detection and Disease Monitoring. 
Biosecurity Workshop Conference; June 2, 2003. Washington DC.  
31. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Biological and Chemical Terrorism: 
Strategic Plan for Preparedness and Response. Recommendations of the CDC 
Strategic Planning Workgroup. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2000;49(No. RR-4) 
[inclusive page numbers]. 
32. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, & U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services. The Public Health Response to Biological and Chemical Terrorism: 
Interim Planning Guidance for State Public Health Officials. July 2001.  
33. Henretig F. Biological and Chemical Terrorism Defense: A View From the “Front 
Lines” of Public Health. American Journal of Public Health 2001;91(5):718. 
34. Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response: Use of Information Technologies and 
Decision Support Systems. Summary, Evidence Report/Technology Assessment: 
Number 59, July 2002. Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Rockville, MD. 
Available at http://www.ahrq.gov/clinic/epcsums/bioitsum.htm. Accessed March 11, 
2003. 
35. Barry MA. Public Health Surveillance: A local health department perspective, Boston 
Public Health Commission. 2002. 
36. Lombardo J. Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of 
Community-Based Epidemics II (ESSENCE II). The National Syndromic 
Surveillance Conference Agenda; September 23-24, 2002; New York, NY. Session 
III, September 23. 
37. DoD-GEISWeb. ESSENCE: Electronic surveillance system for the early notification 
of community-based epidemics. Available at 
http://www.geis.ha.osd.mil/GEIS/SurveillanceActivities/ESSENCE/ESSENCE.asp. 
Accessed March 7, 2003. 
38. Pavlin J. Executive Summary: DoD-GEIS Implementation of Electronic Surveillance 
for Emerging Infections, Including Bioterrorism, DoD- Global Emerging Infections 
System. 2003. 
39. Center for Biomedical Informatics, University of Pittsburgh. Realtime Outbreak and 
Disease Surveillance (RODS) Laboratory; software packages. Available at 
http://www.health.pitt.edu/rods/sw/default.htm. Accessed June 6, 2003. 
40. Center for Biomedical Informatics, University of Pittsburgh. Realtime Outbreak and 
Disease Surveillance (RODS) Laboratory; Demonstration Systems. Available at 
http://www.health.pitt.edu/rods. Accessed June 9, 2003. 
 184 
41. Zelicoff A, Caskey S, Mann G. The Rapid Syndrome Validation Project (RSVP) 
Users’ Manual and Description. Sandia national Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM. 
Draft Version 2.3 (7/21/02). 
42. Hillsborough County Health Department. Introducing: STAR-Syndromic Tracking 
and Reporting System. Unpublished presentation; 2003. 
43. ScenPro, Inc. What is LEADERS? A presentation. Available at 
http://www.scenpro.com. 2002. 
44. Nierengarten MB, Lutwick L, Lutwick S. Syndrome-based Surveillance for 
Clinicians on the Frontlines of Healthcare: Focus on Rapid Diagnosis and 
Notification. Medscape, June 6, 2003. Available at 
http://www.medscape.com/viewprogram/2427_pnt. Accessed June 20, 2003. 
45. ICPA, Inc. RedBat software; Syndromic surveillance made easy. Available at 
http://www.icpa.net/redbat.htm. Accessed March 7, 2003. 
46. Lawson B, Fitzhugh E, Hall S, Garcia M, Hutwagner L, Seeman GM. Implementing 
the CDC Early Aberration Reporting System (EARS): A Front-Line Perspective from 
the Knox County (TN) Health Department. The National Syndromic Surveillance 
Conference Agenda; September 23-24, 2002; New York, NY. Poster presentation. 
47. DSHI Systems, Inc. Effortless Data Collection with SURVEIL! Available at 
http://www.dshisystems.com/surveil.  
48. DSHI Systems, Inc. Frequently Asked Questions from 2002 National Syndromic 
Surveillance Conference. Available at http://www.dshisystems.com. 
49. DSHI Systems, Inc. Frequently Asked Questions DSHI Syndromic Surveillance 
Homeland Security. Available at http://www.dshisystems.com.  
50. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The National Electronic Disease 
Surveillance System (NEDSS). Available at http://www.cdc.gov/nedss/index.htm. 
Accessed September 20, 2002. 
51. Teutsch SM, Churchill RE. Principles and Practice of Public Health Surveillance. 
2nd Ed. New York: Oxford Press. 2000. 
52. Hartman RT. Military Deployment Health Surveillance and Its Application to United 
States Special Operations Forces: A Policy Analysis. USF College of Public Health 
Dissertation. 2002. 
53. Fraser MR, Brown DL. Bioterrorism Preparedness and Local Public Health Agencies: 
Building Response Capacity. Public Health Reports 2000;115:326-330. 
54. Brachman PS, O’Maonaigh HC, Miller RN. Perspectives on the Department of 
Defense Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System-A Program 
Review. Washington, DC: National Academy Press. 2001. 
55. Jones J. Project Eyes Global Early Warning System for the Internet. Federal 
Computer Week. September 30, 2002. Available at http://www.fcw.com. Accessed 
October 4, 2002. 
 185 
56. Murray GH. Memo: Enhanced Surveillance of Disease Patterns Associated with 
Biological and Chemical Agents. Headquarters United States Air Force. Washington, 
DC. November 1, 2001. 
57. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. HIPAA Privacy Rule and public health: 
guidance from CDC and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. 
MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2003;52 (Early Release):[inclusive page numbers]. 
58. Kuzma JW. Basic Statistics for the Health Sciences. 3rd ed. Mountain View, CA: 
Mayfield Publishing. 1998. 
59. Campbell MJ. Statistics at Square Two. London: BMJ Publishing. 2001. 
60. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Division of Tuberculosis- Trends by Age 
Group. Available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchstp/tb/worldtb2001/age.htm. Accessed 
February 11, 2003. 
61. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. CDC Fact Book 2000/2001. Available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/maso/factbook/main.htm. Accessed February 11, 2003. 
62. Toth B, Bodager D, Hammond RM, Kass-Hout T, et al. Outbreak of Salmonella 
Serotyp Javiana Infections- Orlando, Florida, June 2002. ProMED-mail. August 9, 
2002. 
63. Sanderson R. Feb 13, 2003 Norovirus Update. Unpublished manuscript. 
64. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Outbreaks of Gastroenteritis Associated 
with Noroviruses on Cruise Ships – United States, 2002. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly 
Rep 2002;51(49):1112-1115. 
65. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Norovirus Activity---United States, 
2002. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rpt 2003;52(3):41-45. 
66. Florida Department of Helath. Reported Influenza-Like Illnesses in Florida for 
Reporting Year 2001-2001 and 2002-2003. Available at 
http://www.doh.state.fl.us/disease_ctrl/epi/htopics/flu/graphs.htm. 
67. Center for Disease Control and Prevention. Weekly Percent of Influenza-Like Illness 
Based on Total Sentinel Providers Patient Visits for the South Atlantic Region. 
Available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/diseases/flu/regions/senreg5.htm.  
68. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Percentage of Visits for Influenza-Like 
Illness Reported by Sentinel Providers National Summary, 2002-03. Available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/diseases/flu/weekly.htm. 
69. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. WHO/NREVSS Collaborating 
Laboratories National Summary, 2002-2003. Available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/diseases/flu/weekly.htm. 
70. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Influenza Isolates from the South 
Atlantic Region Reported by WHO/NREVSS Collaborating Laboratories 2002-2003 
Season. Available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/diseases/flu/regions/whoreg5.htm.  
 186 
71. Szklo M, Nieto FJ. Epidemiology Beyond the Basics. Gaithersburg, MA: Aspen 
Publishers. 2000. 
72. Buehler JW. Surveillance. In: Rothman, Greenland S, eds. Modern Epidemiology. 2nd 
ed. Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott, Williams and Wilkins. 1998;435-457. 
73. Melnick AL. Introduction to Geographic Information Systems in Public Health. 
Gaithersburg, MA: Aspen Publishers. 2002. 
74. Barclay L. Public Health Strategy: A Newsmaker Interview With Julie Gerberding, 
MD, MPH. Medscape. October 30, 2002. Available at 
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/443762?mpid=5761. Accessed November 6, 
2003. 
75. Dingell JD. Subcommittee on oversight and investigations hearing on ”A review of 
federal bioterrorism preparedness programs: building an early warning public health 
surveillance system”. November 1, 2001. Available at 
http://www.house.gov/commerce_democrats/press/107st64.htm. Accessed March 7, 
2003.  
76. Green MS, Kaufman Z. Surveillance for early detection and monitoring of infectious 
disease outbreaks associated with bioterrorism. Isr Med Assoc J July 2002;4(7):503-
6. 
77. Bhatt S. Could a cough count detect bioterrorism? Palm Beach Post, February 14, 
2002. Palm Beach, FL. 
78. Merriam-Webster’s Medical Dictionary. Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster, 
Incorporated. 1995. 
79. Webster’s II New Riverside Dictionary, Revised Edition. Boston, MA: Houghton 
Mifflin Company. 1996. 
 
 187 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Arnon SS, Schechter R, Inglesby TV, et al. Botulinum Toxin as a Biological 
Weapon: medical and public health management. JAMA 2001;285:1059-1070. 
Ashford DA, Kaiser RM, Bales ME, et al. Planning Against Biological Terrorism: 
Lessons From Outbreak Investigations. Emerging Infectious Diseases 2003;9(5). 
Bales M, Dannenberg A, Brachman P, et al. Epidemiologic Response to Anthrax 
Outbreaks: Field Investigations, 1950-2001. Emerging Infectious Diseases 2002;8(10). 
Bardi J. Aftermath of a Hypothetical Smallpox Disaster. Emerging and Infectious 
Diseases 2000;5(4). 
Benneyan JC, Satz D, Flowers SH. Development of a Web-Based Multifacility 
Healthcare Surveillance Information System. Journal of Healthcare Information 
Management Systems 2000;14(3):19-26. 
Bohnker BK, Captain, MCUSN(FS). Disease and Nonbattle Injury Patterns: Afloat 
Data from the U.S. Fifth Fleet (2000-2001). Military Medicine 2003;168:131-134. 
Bombardt JNJ. Contagious Disease Dynamics for Biological Warfare and 
Bioterrorism Casualty Assessments. Alexandria, Institute for Defense Analyses. 2000. 
Broad WJ, Miller J. Health Data Monitored for Bioterror Warning. Promed, January 
29, 2003. 
CDC Bioterrorism Task Force, CDC Hospital Infections Program Bioterrorism 
Working Group. Bioterrorism Readiness Plan: A Template for Healthcare Facilities. 
April 13, 1999. Available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/hip/Bio/13apr99APIC-
CDCBioterrorism.PDF. Accessed January 5, 2003. 
Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Weapons of Mass Destruction Capabilities in 
the Middle East. Monterey Institute of International Studies. Accessed January 2, 2003. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Adverse Events Following Civilian 
Smallpox Vaccination-United States. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2003;52(20):475-
477. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Medical Management of Smallpox 
Vaccine Adverse Reactions. December 12, 2002. Available at 
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/446290?mpid=7441. Accessed January 2, 2003. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Press Release: As Americans Reflect on 
9/11, HHS and CDC Continue to Aggressively Prepare the Nation for Another Terrorist 
Attack. September 9, 2002. CDC Media Relations. Accessed September 20, 2002. 
 188 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Smallpox Vaccine Recommendations 
Detailed by CDC. January 15, 2003. Available at 
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/447990_print. Accessed January 24, 2003. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Update: Influenza Activity - United 
States, 2002-03 Season. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 2003;52(2):26-28. 
Chyba CF. Biological Terrorism and Public Health. Survival 2001;43(1):93-106. 
Davis CJ. Nuclear Blindness: An Overview of the Biological Weapons Programs of 
the Former Soviet Union and Iraq. Emerging Infectious Diseases 1999;5(4). 
Dennis DT, Inglesby TV, Henderson DA, et al. Tularemia as a Biological Weapon: 
medical and public health management. JAMA 2001;285:2763-2773. 
Fox A, et al. Report of the “Bioterrorism Workshop” Duke University Thomas 
Center on April 2-4, 2002, organized by US Army Research Office. J Microbiological 
Methods 2002;1665. 
Franz DR, et al. Clinical Recognition and Management of Patients Exposed to 
Biological Warfare Agents. JAMA 1997;278(5):399-411. 
Goldberg J. A Reporter at Large: The Great Terror. The New Yorker 2002;52-75. 
Gore L. ACEP Hails Passage of Bioterrorism Bill in the House. May 22, 2002. 
American College of Emergency Physicians. Washington, DC. Available at 
http://www.acep.org/1,5216,0.html. Accessed March 7, 2003.  
Gregg MB. Field Epidemiology. New York, NY: Oxford Press. 1996. 
Griffin MR, Neuzil KM. The Global Implications of Influenza in Hong Kong. N 
Engl J Med 2002;347(26):2159-2162. 
Hashimoto S, Murakami Y, Taniguchi K, Nagai M. Detection of epidemics in their 
early stage through infectious disease surveillance. International Journal of Epidemiology 
2000;29:905-910. 
Henderson DA. Surveillance of Smallpox. International Journal of Epidemiology 
1976;5(1):19-28. 
Henderson DA, Inglesby TV, Bartlett JG, et al. Smallpox as a Biological Weapon: 
medical and public health management. JAMA 1999;281:2127-2137. 
Henry L. Stimson Center. Biological Weapons Proliferation Concerns. 2002. 
Available at http://www.stimson.org/?SN=CB2001121274. Accessed February 10, 2003. 
Hertzberg J. Disease Registries for Biological and Chemical Terrorism. Information 
Technology Nov 2001:58-59. 
Hughes JM, Gerberding JL. Anthrax Bioterrorism: Lessons Learned and Future 
Directions. Emerging and Infectious Diseases 2002;8(10). 
Hurlbert RE. Microbiology 101 Internet Text: Chapter XV, Addendum: Biological 
Weapons; Malignant Biology. Washington State University, 2000. Accessed February 
15, 2003. 
 189 
Inglesby TV, Dennis DT, Henderson DA, et al. Plague as a Biological Weapon: 
medical and public health management. JAMA 2000;283:2281-2290. 
Inglesby TV, Henderson DA, Bartlett JG, et al. Anthrax as a Biological Weapon: 
medical and public health management. JAMA 1999;281:1735-1745. 
Leidig M. Czechs Believe Iraq "Very Likely" Has Former USSR Smallpox Virus 
Stock. Medscape. January 2003. Available at 
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/448015_print. Accessed January 24, 2003. 
Lopman BA, Reacher MH, van Duijnhoven Y, et al. Viral Gastroenteritis Outbreaks 
in Europe, 1995-2000. Emerging Infectious Diseases. 2003;9(1). 
McCarthy M. USA moves quickly to push biodefence research. The Lancet 
2002;360(9335):732.  
McGee MK. Prognosis Good For Key Patient-Care Issues. Information Week 500: 
Health Care & Medical. September 23, 2002. 
Meltzer MI, et al. Modeling Potential Responses to Smallpox as a Bioterrorist 
Weapon. Emerging and Infectious Diseases 2001;7(6). 
Nelson KE, et al. Infectious Disease Epidemiology Theory and Practice. 
Gaithersburg, MA: Aspen Publishers. 2001. 
Pavlin JA. Epidemiology of Bioterrorism. Emerging Infectious Diseases 2000;5(4). 
Reis BY, Mandl KD. Time series modeling for syndromic surveillance. BioMed 
Central. January 23, 2003. Available at http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6947/3/2. 
Accessed June 6, 2003. 
Rotz LD, et al; for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Public Health 
Assessment of Potential Biological Terrorism Agents. Emerging Infectious Diseases 
2002;8(2). 
Sebastiani P. Syndromic Surveillance to Monitor Influenza. Biosecurity Workshop 
Conference; June 2, 2003. Washington DC. 
Snacken R, Kendal AP, Haaheim LR, Wood JM. The Next Influenza Pandemic: 
Lessons from Hong Kong, 1997. Emerging Infectious Diseases 1999;5(2). 
Stafford N. Discord on German Bioterror Defense. Yahoo! News, January 14, 2003. 
Accessed January 15, 2003. 
Stafford N. Germany to Buy Another 65 Million Smallpox Vaccination. Medscape. 
December 20, 2002. Available at http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/446727_print. 
Accessed January 2, 2003. 
Stafford N. Top German Disease Official Warns of Urgent Need for Bioterror 
Preparedness. January 13, 2003. Available at 
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/447884_print. Accessed January 24, 2003. 
Starr B, Ensor D, & Koppel A. U.S. officials: Iraq ordered nerve gas antidote. 
November 13, 2002. CNN. Available at http://www.cnn.com. Accessed May 29, 2003. 
 190 
Stroup DF, Wharton M, Kafadar K, Dean AG. Evaluation of a Method for Detecting 
Aberrations in Public Health Surveillance Data. American Journal of Epidemiology 
1993;137(3):373-380. 
Temte JL. Guest Editorial: A Family Doc Looks at Smallpox. Medscape Infectious 
Diseases 2002;4(2). 
Thomas JC, Weber DJ. Epidemiological Methods for the Study of Infectious 
Diseases. New York, NY: Oxford Press. 2001. 
Thompson WW, Shay DK, Weintraub E, et al. Mortality Associated With Influenza 
and Respiratory Syncytial Virus in the United States. JAMA 2003;289(2):179-186. 
Tucker JB. Improving Infectious Disease Surveillance to Combat Bioterrorism and 
Natural Emerging Infections. Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies. Available at http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/testtuck.htm. 
Accessed September 3, 2002. 
Turabian KL ed. A Manual for Writers of Term papers, Theses, and Dissertations. 
6th ed. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 1996.  
Wagner MM, Tsui FC, Espino JU, et al. The Emerging Science of Very Early 
Detection of Disease Outbreaks. Public Health Management Practice 2001;7(6):51-59. 
Ward DE. Florida Interim Smallpox Response Plan and Guidelines, Florida 
Department of Health. December 4, 2001. Available at 
http://www.doh.state.fl.us/php/info/smallpoxplan.htm. Accessed December 11, 2002. 
Wheelis M. Biological Warfare at the 1346 Siege of Caffa. Emerging and Infectious 
Diseases 2002;8(9). 
WHO Group of Consultants. Health Aspects of Biological and Chemical Weapons. 
2nd ed. Geneva: World Health Organization. 2001:20-22.  
Woodall J. The Role of Computer Networking in Investigating Unusual Disease 
Outbreaks and Allegations of Biological and Toxin Weapons Use. Critical Reviews in 
Microbiology 1998;24(3):255-272. 
 
 191 
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: DATA COLLECTION FORMS 
192 
APPENDIX A: DATA COLLECTION FORMS 
 
Figure A1. Hospital X Data Entry Form 
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Figure A2. Military Facility Data Entry Form 
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Figure A3. Theme Park A Data Entry Form 
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Figure A4. Theme Park B Data Entry Form 
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Figure B1. Employee Distribution by Department, Theme Park A 
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Figure B2. Syndromic Distribution, Theme Park A Employees (7 Departments) 
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Figure B3. Employee Distribution by Department, Theme Park B 
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Figure B4. Syndromic Distribution, Theme Park B Employees (10 Departments) 
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Figure C1. Baseline vs. Test Period, “Contact Dermatitis” at Military Facility 
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Figure C2. Baseline vs. Test Period, “Encephalopathy/Meningitis” at Military Facility 
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Figure C3. Baseline vs. Test Period. “Fever Unknown Origin” at Military Facility 
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Figure C4. Baseline vs. Test Period, “Influenza-like Illness” at Theme Park A 
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Figure C5. Baseline vs. Test Period, “Rash with Fever” at Theme Park A 
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Figure C6. Baseline vs. Test Period, “Encephalopathy/Menengitis” at Theme Park A 
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Baseline vs. Test Period 
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Figure C7. Baseline vs. Test Period,  
“Respiratory Tract Infection w/Fever” at Theme Park B 
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Figure C8. Baseline vs. Test Period, “Influenza-like Illness” at Theme Park B 
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Figure C9. Baseline vs. Test Period, “Rash with Fever” at Theme Park B 
APPENDIX C (Continued) 
209 
Baseline vs. Test Period 
"Encephalopathy/Meningitis" 
at Theme Park B
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26
Week
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Baseline
Test Period
 
Figure C10. Baseline vs. Test Period, “Encephalopathy/Meningitis” at Theme Park B 
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Figure D1. Overall Study Period, “Respiratory Track Infection w/Fever” by Facility 
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Figure D2. Overall Study Period, “Gastroenteritis” by Facility 
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Figure D3. Overall Study Period, “Influenze-like Illness” by Facility 
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Figure D4. Overall Study Period, “Rash with Fever” by Facility 
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Figure D5. Overall Study Period, “Contact Dermatitis” by Facility 
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Figure D6. Overall Study Period, “Influenza” by Facility 
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Figure D7. Overall Study Period, “Encephalopathy/Meningitis” by Facility 
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Figure D8. Overall Study Period, “Fever Unknown Origin” by Facility 
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Figure D9. Overall Study Period, “Febrile Illness” by Facility 
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Figure D10. Overall Study Period, “Shock/Sepsis” by Facility 
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Figure E1. Seasonal Variation Overall Study Period  
“Respiratory Tract Infection w/Fever” 
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Figure E2. Seasonal Variation Overall Study Period “Gastroenteritis” 
APPENDIX E (Continued) 
222 
Seasonal Variation
Overall Study Period
"Influenza-like Illness" 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Ma
y  
   1
Jun
e  
  5
Jul
y  
   9
Au
g  
  1
3
Se
pt 
  1
7
Oc
t   
 21
No
v  
  2
5
De
c  
 29
Jan
    
33
Fe
b  
  3
7
Ma
r   
 41
Ap
r   
 45
Month & Week
C
ou
nt
Frequency
2002 2003
 
Figure E3. Seasonal Variation Overall Study Period “Influenza-like Illness” 
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Figure E4. Seasonal Variation Overall Study Period “Rash with Fever” 
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Figure E5. Seasonal Variation Overall Study Period “Contact Dermatitis” 
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Figure E6. Seasonal Variation Overall Study Period “Influenza” 
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Figure E7. Seasonal Variation Overall Study Period “Fever of Unknown Origin” 
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Figure E8. Seasonal Variation Overall Study Period “Febrile Illness” 
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Figure E9. Seasonal Variation Overall Study Period “Encephalopathy/Meningitis” 
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Figure E10. Seasonal Variation Overall Study Period “Non-Traumatic Shock/Sepsis” 
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APPENDIX F: GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF ALL SYNDROMIC REPORTS 
 
Figure F1.  
Geographical Distribution of All Syndromic Data in the Central Florida Area,  
May 29, 2002 – April 13, 2003 
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Figure F2. Detailed Zoom of Figure F1 
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APPENDIX G: GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF “RESPIRATORY TRACT INFECTION WITH 
FEVER” IN THE CENTRAL FLORIDA AREA 
 
 
Figure G1. Geographical Distribution of “Respiratory Tract Infection with Fever” 
in the Central Florida Area, May 29, 2002 – April 13, 2003. 
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Figure G2. Zoom of G1 
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Figure H1. Baseline vs Test Period: “Rash w/ Fever” 
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Figure H2. Baseline vs. Test Period: “Shock/Sepsis” 
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Figure H3. Baseline vs. Test Period: “Encephalopathy Meningitis” 
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1. Aberration. Describes the deviation in data compared to the normal pattern of data. 
2. Alert. Aberrations in the data that are three standard deviations or more above the 30-
day rolling mean. 
3. Application Service Provider (ASP). A business model where a company provides 
software applications over the Internet. The users of this software subscribe to the 
service for as long as they use the software, rather than buying a license and installing 
it on their own machines. 
4. Active Server Pages (ASP.NET). Technology used for making database-driven web-
based computer applications. 
5. Automated alert. Generated by the BioDefend system as data is received, 
calculated, and compared to the normal threshold. Any deviation from the normal 
threshold that is measured at or above 3 standard deviations above the rolling 30-day 
mean is considered an alert. 
6. Automated analysis. The automatic calculation and comparison of data against 
normal thresholds. 
7. Automated warning. Generated by the BioDefend system as data is received, 
calculated, and compared to the normal threshold. Any deviation from the normal 
threshold that is measured between two and three standard deviations above the 
rolling 30-day mean is considered a warning. 
8. Baseline. Data used to determine thresholds for reporting events above normal. 
9. Bioterrorism. “The unlawful use, or threatened use, of microorganisms or toxins 
derived from living organisms to produce death or disease in humans, animals, or 
plants. The act is intended to create fear and/or intimidate governments or societies in 
the pursuit of political, religious, or ideological goals” (11). 
10. Bioterrorism Syndromic Surveillance. A type of surveillance used to track specific 
syndromes that can potentially serve as indicators of most infectious diseases and 
bioterrorism agent exposure in a specified population (3). 
11. Bio-threat. The potential risk of a biological attack (74). 
12. Bio-weapon. A device used to deliver and disseminate biological agents that are 
designed to cause disease, death, or damage to the environment and humans (74). 
13. Database Management System (DBMS). A program that enables the user to create 
relational data applications and allows the user to store, modify, and remove 
information from the database. 
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14. Dual-use. Having the ability to detect biological agent and infectious disease 
exposures within a single system. 
15. Epidemic. Affecting a large population within a community or region with a disease 
in excess of the normal expectancy (10). 
16. Genetic Engineering. “The directed alteration of genetic material by intervention in 
genetic processes” (73). 
17. Geographic Information System (GIS). A software toolset that is linked to a database 
and temporally displays spatial data from the real world onto a map through the 
retrieval, analysis, manipulation, modeling, and storage of the data (64).  
18. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). An act written 
for the purposes of preventing the distribution of identifiable health information such 
as patient identification number, address, phone number, zip code, birth date, and any 
other identifiable information from being used to identify patients (57). 
19. International Classification of Diseases, 9th revision (ICD-9 codes). “The 
classification of specific conditions and groups of conditions determined by an 
internationally representative group of experts who advise the World Health 
Organization.” There are 21 chapters within the manual (10). 
20. Near Real-Time. Data captured within minutes of being reported. 
21. Outbreak. A localized increase of a disease of epidemic proportion within a small 
area, such as a village, town, or closed institution (10). 
22. Predictive Value Positive. The amount of positive validity of reported cases, or 
outbreaks, that is under surveillance (3). 
23. Public Health Surveillance. “The ongoing, systematic collection, analysis, 
interpretation, and dissemination of data regarding a health-related event for use in 
public health action to reduce morbidity and mortality and to improve health” (1). 
24. Redundant Array of Inexpensive Disks (RAID). Computer hardware that continually 
updates copies of data onto multiple disks for added security of the possible loss of 
data.  
25. Rolling 30-day mean. Creates a series of averages from adjacent observations for the 
last 30 days and is used to model cycles in the data. 
26. Sensitivity. “The proportion of cases, or outbreaks, existing in the jurisdiction that is 
detected by the system” (3). 
27. Sentinel Surveillance. “Surveillance based on selected population samples chosen to 
represent the relevant experience of particular groups” (10).  
28. Standard deviation. The square root of the variance of the total number of 
observations (71). 
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29. Structured Query Language (SQL). A standardized query language that allows the 
user to request information from the database.  
30. Syndrome. A group of symptom complexes gathered before the diagnosis is made, 
and could be considered to be an early indicator of most infectious disease and 
biological agent exposures (10). 
31. Theme Park Referral Hospital/Clinic. A hospital or clinic that provides care for guest 
and employees that is referred by the theme parks. 
32. Warning. An aberration in the data between two and three standard deviations above 
the rolling 30-day mean. 
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